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NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL: COMITY AND
CONFLICT IN TRANSNATIONAL FRAND DISPUTES
Eli Greenbaum*
Abstract: Recent years have seen an explosion in FRAND litigation, in which parties
commit to license intellectual property under “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”
(FRAND) terms, but they cannot agree on the meaning of that commitment. Much of this
litigation is multinational and involves coordinating patent, antitrust, and contract claims
across several jurisdictions. A number of courts and commentators have aimed to centralize
and thereby streamline these disputes, whether by consolidating all litigation in one judicial
forum or through the creation of a comprehensive arbitral process. This Article argues that
such efforts are misguided—FRAND disputes are particularly unamenable to centralization,
and the costs of centralizing FRAND disputes are high. Rather, absent other agreement
between the parties, FRAND disputes should be resolved through the ordinary territorial
structures of patent law, and attempts to simplify these disputes should focus on procedural
and substantive coordination across jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Patents grant territorial rights—they guard against infringement only
within the state that issued the patent.1 In contrast, patent disputes
*

Partner, Yigal Arnon & Co., Jerusalem, Israel; J.D., Yale Law School; M.S., Columbia University.
1. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (observing that “[a] patent
right is limited by the metes and bounds of the jurisdictional territory that granted the right to
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increasingly flout international borders. Patent FRAND litigation in
particular tends to sprawl across multiple countries. In a typical FRAND
dispute, a patentee has committed to provide a “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) license, but the parties cannot agree on the
definitive meaning of those terms.2 Ensuing litigation can entangle the
parties in global snarls of the patent, antitrust, and contract laws of
multiple jurisdictions, intertwined with questions of international trade
policy and national security strategy. While many courts and
commentators aim to centralize and thereby streamline these disputes, this
Article argues against the instinct to consolidate. Rather, absent other
agreement between the parties, FRAND disputes should be resolved
through the ordinary territorial structures of patent law, and attempts to
simplify these disputes should focus on procedural and substantive
coordination between jurisdictions.
Patentees most frequently make FRAND commitments when they are
involved in technological standard-setting activities. Such technology
standards often aim to facilitate global interoperability and, as a result, the
disputes that they ignite consistently rage across jurisdictional lines.3 For
example, a current FRAND-related dispute between Apple and
Qualcomm involves patents covering cellular telecommunication
standards.4 Those standards allow for worldwide communication between
cellular devices. Such devices are built with different hardware, run on
different software, and communicate across the separate networks of

exclude”); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 437 (2007) (reiterating “the general rule
under United States patent law that no infringement occurs when a patented product is made and sold
in another country”). The United States Patent Act is explicitly limited to acts “within the United
States” and the importation of a patented invention “into the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(2012). The limited statutory exceptions to this general rule are beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality and Patent Infringement Damages,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, What is “FRAND” All About? The Licensing of Patents Essential
to an Accepted Standard, CARDOZO LAW (2014), https://cardozo.yu.edu/what-“frand”-all-aboutlicensing-patents-essential-accepted-standard [https://perma.cc/WZB4-LVXU] (“SSOs created
FRAND — a requirement that SSO members license SEPs on “Fair, Reasonable, and NonDiscriminatory” terms to other members of the SSO and, very often, non-members who use the
standard.”).
3. See, e.g., Pierre Larouche & Nicolo Zingales, Injunctive Relief in the EU – Intellectual Property
and Competition Law at the Remedies Stage, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 419 (Jorge L. Contreras ed. 2017) [hereinafter
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION] (observing that in a FRAND dispute, “almost every other element
in the dispute is global or at least regional . . . the standards are global, the industry players operate
globally, products are developed and marketed globally”).
4. See Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145835 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007).
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different countries—yet, the establishment of global telecommunication
standards allows for easy communications across those differences.5 The
dispute between Apple and Qualcomm over the use of those standards
also cuts across national borders, involving civil litigation in five
countries and related investigations by a number of national regulatory
authorities.6 Similarly, a recent FRAND dispute between Samsung and
Huawei involved parallel litigation in both the United States and China,7
and another recent dispute between TCL and Ericsson generated related
proceedings in seven countries.8
Indeed, FRAND disputes can spawn litigation in each country in which
standard-compliant products and services are made available. Each such
country can see claims under its domestic patent laws (for example,
regarding unlicensed patent infringement), antitrust framework (for
example, regarding the unlawful use of market power conferred by
standard-essential patents), and contract law (regarding the parties’
contractual obligations under the FRAND commitment).9 A number of
jurisdictions, sometimes in an attempt to streamline the complexity of the
transnational dispute, have recently seized the authority to make a single
FRAND royalty determination applicable to worldwide activities. In two
recent decisions, a United States district court set FRAND royalty rates
for worldwide sales despite parallel foreign litigation.10 Similarly, two
5. Id. at *4 (noting that standards are intended “to facilitate worldwide connectivity”).
6. Id. at *54 (summarizing litigation between the parties in the United States as well as China,
Japan, Taiwan and the United Kingdom, and related regulatory investigations in China, Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan). The United States Federal Trade Commission is also currently litigating related issues
against Qualcomm. See FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-002220-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98632, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (denying Qualcomm’s motion to dismiss claims advanced
by the FTC).
7. See Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No.3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63052 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) (enjoining parallel litigation in China).
8. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-00341JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *10–15 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (summarizing
litigation between the parties in the United States, as well as Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom).
9. See, e.g., Apple, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835, at *9 (noting that the United States actions “can
be separated into three categories: breach of contract claims, patent claims, and antitrust claims” and
describing foreign patent and competition law claims); Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *11
(describing the parties’ contract, patent, and antitrust claims). Regarding the use of antitrust claims in
FRAND disputes, compare A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make
FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2111 (2018) (arguing that “antitrust laws
have an important role to play” in enforcing FRAND commitments), with Douglas H. Ginsburg et al.,
The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Oct.
2015) (arguing that the use of antitrust law to enforce FRAND commitments is “troubling”).
10. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.
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British courts have recently asserted the jurisdiction to set worldwide
FRAND rates over the defendant’s strident objections.11 Additionally, the
Chinese judiciary may soon also demand the right to impose a worldwide
resolution on FRAND litigants.12 And in the recent United States case of
Huawei Techs. Co v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,13 the question of consolidation
was squarely before the court.14
This Article argues that courts should resist the temptation to
streamline worldwide FRAND litigation through consolidation of the
dispute in one jurisdiction. Indeed, absent other agreement between the
litigants, standard-setting organizations should themselves disavow
consolidation and instead require the jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
adjudication of FRAND disputes. Outside the FRAND context,
commentators have wrestled with the challenges posed by multinational
patent litigation, and a number of scholars have advocated for the
consolidation of cross-border disputes in order to reduce the cost and
expense of litigation across jurisdictions.15 But this Article argues that
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341 JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). Both the Microsoft and TCL Courts found that the resolution of the United
States litigation would be “dispositive of” related foreign litigation. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2012); TCL Commc’n. Tech. Holdings, Ltd., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *17.
11. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. 711, p. 543 (Eng.), aff’d,
[2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 (stating that country-by-country licensing would be “madness” and that
“[a] worldwide license would be far more efficient”); Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L v.
Huawei Techs. Co., [2018] E.W.H.C. 808, p. 28 (Eng.), aff’d, [2019] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 38 (noting that
without a global resolution of the FRAND dispute, the patentee would be required “to seek separate
licenses for each individual country[,] . . . by commencing separate litigation in each such territory”).
12. Conversant, [2019] EWCA (Civ) 28 p. 123 (describing recent guidelines issued by the
Guangdong High People’s Court in China regarding SEP disputes, and the possibility that Chinese courts
may assert jurisdictions to impose a worldwide FRAND resolution).
13. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63052 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018).
14. Id. at *27–28 (presenting the question of whether the court has the “ability to determine a FRAND
royalty rate . . . whether based on global or domestic SEPs”). The Samsung case settled before the court
could decide whether it could impose a worldwide FRAND resolution. See Huawei Techs. Co., v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 757 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
15. See generally Marketa Trimble, GAT, Solvay, and the Centralization of Patent Litigation in
Europe, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 515, 515 (2012) (asserting that “[c]oncentrating litigation . . . [in] one
national or multinational court could result in faster, more efficient, and more consistent” patent
enforcement); Kerry J. Begley, Multinational Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United
States Can Learn from Past and Present European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521, 526 (2007)
(arguing that multinational patent litigation would best be handled through a “common patent judicial
system”); Kendra Robins, Extraterritorial Patent Enforcement and Multinational Patent Litigation:
Proposed Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1311 (2007) (asserting that American courts
should consolidate foreign and domestic patent suits into a single proceeding); Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. &
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allowing consolidation has produced legal uncertainty and jurisdictional
conflict, and the costs of those uncertainties and conflicts are higher in the
FRAND context. Moreover, FRAND disputes display distinctive
characteristics that make such litigation particularly unamenable to
centralization. And unlike patent litigation in general, the FRAND
commitment’s contractual basis can be used to simplify and reduce the
costs of territorial adjudication. As such, in the increasing number of
multinational FRAND disputes, courts and standard-setting organizations
should reject the global consolidation of claims.
I.

CONSOLIDATION

This Part discusses several recent cases in the United States and United
Kingdom in which courts have asserted jurisdiction to set global FRAND
royalty rates—effectively consolidating a multinational dispute about
royalties into a single proceeding. Section A provides some initial
background on the FRAND commitment, and then reviews those recent
cases in which courts have asserted jurisdiction to resolve multinational
FRAND disputes. Section B describes the practical and theoretical
problems raised by these cases. Section C elaborates on one specific
difficulty in these cases by asking whether United States courts have
subject matter jurisdiction to make such global royalty determinations.
A.

Cases

FRAND litigation centers on the patent rights covering technical
standards. Such patents are often described as “standard essential,” since
use of the patented technology is essential for implementation of the
standard.16 Standard-setting organizations frequently require patentees to
commit to licensing their standard essential patents (SEPs) on FRAND
terms.17 The FRAND commitment has two primary objectives. On the one
hand, FRAND commitments are intended to provide assurance that the
patented, proprietary technology is available for incorporation in goods

MARY L. REV. 711, 788 (2009) (advocating for the “greater use of consolidated adjudication of
infringement claims”); Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property
Disputes: Why Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK J. INT’L L. 819, 829–30 (2004) (describing principles
which may be used for the consolidation of intellectual property disputes).
16. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for
Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1135 (2013); Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate
Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2019).
17. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1135.
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and services that depend on the relevant standards.18 On the other hand,
the FRAND commitment, and its dispensation to collect “fair and
reasonable” royalties, is intended to allow patent owners to secure fair
compensation for their investments in innovation.19 However, the typical
FRAND commitment is terse and vague.20 Parties are typically left
without clear guidance in the event of a dispute over the technology’s
availability or the magnitude of the royalties.21
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc.,22 one of the first judicial
calculations of a FRAND royalty rate, a United States court imposed a
flat, worldwide royalty rate that did not vary by jurisdiction.23 In that case,
Motorola owned patents covering technology in wireless and video
standards and demanded royalties from Microsoft for the use of such
technology.24 Microsoft responded that those royalty demands were
neither fair nor reasonable and, as such, were made in breach of
Motorola’s FRAND commitment.25 The parties consented to the
determination of a FRAND royalty rate by the district court, which
proceeded to set a single, global FRAND rate for all of Microsoft’s
worldwide sales on certain infringing products.26 The district court’s rate
calculations blurred any distinction between United States and foreign
patent rights versus associated royalty rates. For example, the court set
royalty rates—including for the use of foreign patents—solely by
employing the prevailing methodology of United States patent law.27
18. Id. at 1137.
19. Id.
20. Compare id. at 1137–38 (asserting that “[t]he effectiveness of the FRAND commitment has
been undermined by” its ambiguities), with Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons
from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 796 (2014) (asserting that
the “intentional” ambiguity of the FRAND commitment “can be an important source of economic
value”).
21. Contreras, supra note 16 (explaining that “[w]ith little guidance . . . [parties] are left to
determine FRAND royalty rates in private negotiations”).
22. See No. C10-1823-JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d, 795
F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
23. Id. at *14-15.
24. Id. at *11.
25. Id.
26. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823 JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73827, at *19-22
(W.D. Wash. June 1, 2011) (discussing the parties’ consent to the determination of RAND royalties
by a bench trial).
27. Id. at *48 (explaining the district court’s adoption of a modified Georgia-Pacific framework for
determining a RAND royalty rate). See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES 66
(2013) (noting that “there are important differences in the calculation methods” that different nations
“actually employ” in calculating damages for patent infringement); JORGE L. CONTRERAS, Global
Markets, Competition, and FRAND Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei,
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Indeed, for one of the standards, the court imposed a global FRAND
royalty rate despite the fact that Motorola’s claims were limited to
Microsoft’s infringement of United States (not foreign) patents.28
The Microsoft Court’s assumption of authority to calculate global
FRAND rates impelled the court to interfere with foreign litigation.
Several months following the initiation of litigation in the United States,
Motorola also advanced claims against Microsoft in Germany. 29 In the
German claims, Motorola alleged that Microsoft infringed on German
patents that were covered by the same contractual FRAND commitments
at issue in the United States litigation.30 While Motorola prevailed upon
the German court to issue an injunction prohibiting Microsoft from
infringing those patent in Germany, the United States district court
prohibited Motorola from enforcing that injunction.31 The district court
reasoned that the contractual FRAND commitment required Motorola to
license its SEPs on a “worldwide basis.”32 As the United States court was
charged with determining the parties’ worldwide rights under the FRAND
commitment, and since that determination required the court to decide
whether injunctive relief was allowed under the FRAND contract, the
court held that allowing the injunction to be enforced would “frustrate[]”
the district court’s ability “to adjudicate issues properly before it.”33 In
other words, since the United States court saw the FRAND commitment
as applying on a global basis, it prohibited the parties from enforcing the
decision of a German court regarding territorial patent rights in Germany.
Huawei v. Samsung34 followed a similar pattern, with a United States
court finding that adjudication of the parties’ rights under the FRAND
contract required the United States court to bar enforcement of a foreign
in 17 THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1–8 (2017) (discussing how non-American courts can calculate
FRAND royalties “[w]ithout the baggage of Georgia-Pacific to clutter the analytical exercise”).
28. Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *271 (noting that with respect to the 802.11
standard, Motorola only presented evidence that United States patents were essential to the standard,
“and provided no evidence regarding whether any worldwide counterpart patents were essential”).
29. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 696
F.3d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 2012).
30. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2012).
31. Microsoft, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1103–04.
32. Id. at 1098. In the words of the appellate court that affirmed the district court decision, the
FRAND commitment “makes clear that it encompasses not just U.S. patents, but all of Motorola’s
standard-essential patents worldwide. When that contract is enforced by a U.S. court, the U.S. court
is not enforcing German patent law but, rather, the private law of the contract between the parties.”
Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 884.
33. Microsoft, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
34. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63052 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018).
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judicial order.35 In that case, both parties owned SEPs covering
telecommunication standards.36 The parties invested several years in
negotiating a global patent cross-license but did not succeed in coming to
an agreement.37 The parties commenced FRAND litigation in two
jurisdictions: Huawei filed suit in United States district court, asking the
court to determine the terms for a global FRAND cross-license, and also
filed a number of patent infringement suits in China.38 Samsung
responded with its own multinational patent, antitrust, and contract
counterclaims in the United States and China.39 The Chinese case
progressed quickly, and the Chinese court determined that Samsung
infringed at least two of Huawei’s Chinese patents and issued an
injunction against that infringement.40 Samsung then asked the United
States court, which was still considering the FRAND issues, to enjoin
Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunctions.41
The United States district court granted Samsung’s motion and
enjoined Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunctions.42 The court
found that its own adjudication of the FRAND dispute would dispose of
the Chinese questions—the FRAND commitment acted as a “contractual
umbrella” that controlled whether Huawei had contractually relinquished
its right to seek injunctive relief.43 As such, allowing Huawei to enforce
the Chinese injunctions would undermine the “court’s ability to determine
the propriety of injunctive relief in the first instance.”44 At the same time,
the court left open the broader question of whether it had the authority to
determine a global FRAND rate.45
35. Id. at *8.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *10 (noting that the parties began negotiating a patent cross-license in 2011).
38. Id. at *11. Huawei asserted that the United States and Chinese cases were filed simultaneously,
but that the time differences between the two countries resulted in the Chinese cases being filed on
the next calendar day. Id. at *11 n.5.
39. Id. at *11–12.
40. Id. at *12.
41. Id. at *13–14.
42. Id. at *7.
43. Id. at *27 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 2012)).
44. Id. at *33.
45. Id. at *28. Huawei and Samsung settled their dispute before the Federal Circuit had the
opportunity to rule on Huawei’s appeal of the district court decision. See Huawei Techs. Co. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 757 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2019). A number of United States courts have
declined to issue antisuit injunctions in multinational FRAND disputes. In TQ Delta LLC v. ZyXEL
Commc’ns Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02013-RGA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98228 (D. Del. June 12, 2018), the
court applied a restrictive test and rejected defendant’s motion for an anti-suit injunction against
related FRAND litigation in the United Kingdom. The court asserted that a global FRAND
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Similar issues were raised in TCL v. Ericsson.46 In that case, Ericsson
sued the Chinese manufacturer TCL in the United States and a number of
foreign jurisdictions for TCL’s use of telecommunications standards
covered by Ericsson-owned patents.47 In an effort to come to a global
resolution of their dispute, the parties agreed that a United States district
court could make a determination of worldwide FRAND rates.48 The
court, following a complex economic analysis, set three FRAND rates:
one rate applicable to the United States, a second for Europe, and a third
rate applicable to the “rest of the world.”49 The rates varied according to
the strength of Ericsson’s patent portfolio in each of the three regions— a
correlation that the court saw as demanded by the “fundamental
relationship between FRAND and domestic patent law” of each
jurisdiction.50 At the same time, the court acknowledged that this “global
adjudication”51 by a United States court passed over the “insurmountable
task” of addressing the “technical nuances of patent law in dozens of
jurisdictions.”52 The court, without providing evidence, justified this
omission by asserting that the sum of such differences would be
“relatively trivial” and “insubstantial.”53 As in other global FRAND
adjudications, the TCL Court also intruded into related foreign
proceedings with an anti-suit injunction.54 As noted earlier, the TCL case
involved litigation in seven foreign jurisdictions.55 Following the parties’
agreement, the district court enjoined all those proceedings, reasoning that
the United States global royalty determination would be “dispositive” of
all foreign patent actions.56
determination by the UK court would not preclude the United States court from adjudicating the same
issues. Id. at *9. Moreover, the UK action involved at least one patent that was not a counterpart to
patents litigated in the United States. Id. at *10.
46. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341
JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017).
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the jurisdictions in which the parties litigated
their FRAND dispute).
48. TCL Commc’n. Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *18 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (noting that the
litigants “indicated their desire that this action should result in a ‘global resolution’ of the SEP patent
licensing and damages claims”).
49. Id. at *83.
50. Id. at *79.
51. Id. at *81.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. TCL Commc’n, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *16–19.
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Courts outside the United States have also set global FRAND rates and
enjoined related foreign litigation. The English decision, Unwired Planet
Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co.,57 provides the most extensive analysis to
date of whether a court should determine FRAND royalty rates on a global
basis. Unwired Planet, a non-practicing entity, alleged that certain handset
manufacturers infringed patents covering wireless telecommunication
standards.58 Unwired Planet’s patent portfolio was subject to a FRAND
licensing commitment and the court, in a long and detailed opinion,
calculated FRAND rates for a worldwide license.59 The court rejected
Huawei’s demand that any royalty determination be restricted to a
determination of license terms for United Kingdom patents.60 Observing
that both Unwired Planet and Huawei were companies with global
operations, the court asserted that country-by-country licensing was
“madness” and that a “licensor and licensee acting reasonably” in this
situation “would [] agree[] on a worldwide license.”61 Indeed, the court
observed that almost all comparable licenses introduced at trial were
granted on a worldwide basis.62 The court threatened to enjoin Huawei’s
infringing activities in England if Huawei were to decline to enter into a
license agreement on the terms set by the court—effectively leveraging
the possibility of an injunction in the court’s territorially limited
jurisdiction, in order to impose global royalty rates.63 According to the
court, this decision did not intrude onto the sovereignty of other
jurisdictions since despite the worldwide license, Huawei retained the

57. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C (Pat) 711, (Eng.), aff’d,
[2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344.
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id.
60. Huawei’s opposition to the judicial determination of a global FRAND license in Unwired
Planet contrasts with its own position in its United States litigation against Samsung, in which Huawei
was the party petitioning the court to set a global FRAND license. See supra notes 35–38 and
accompanying text.
61. Unwired Planet International LTD v. Huawei Technologies Co. LTD, 135 REPORTS OF PATENT,
DESIGN, AND TRADE MARK CASES [R.P.C.] 757, 760, 779 (2018) (Eng.). The Unwired court asserted
that the inefficiency of country-by-country licensing was the result of “the effort required to negotiate
and agree so many different licenses and then to keep track of so many different royalty calculations
and payments.” Id. at 760. At the same time, Unwired acknowledged that royalty-rates in a worldwide
FRAND license could differ by “region” and by “standard.” Id. at 779. Indeed, Unwired divided its
worldwide FRAND license into three regions: major markets, China, and other markets. Id. at 779–
807.
62. Id. at 534.
63. Id. at 793.
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right to challenge the “validity or essentiality” of foreign patents in the
relevant foreign jurisdictions.64
The appeals court affirmed the decision, holding that the FRAND
commitment that Huawei was seeking to enforce was global in scope.65
As such, the patentee satisfied its FRAND obligations by offering Huawei
a worldwide license, and the court was within its jurisdiction when it
calculated royalty rates under the patentee’s contractual commitment.66
Without such a worldwide license, the appeals court reasoned, patentees
would be required to bring proceedings in each country worldwide in
order to collect FRAND royalties— a framework that would incentivize
manufacturers “to hold out country by country” until “compelled to
pay.”67 The court further held that calculating global rates did not raise an
unreasonable risk of conflict with comity or foreign judicial decisions,
since “commercial courts around the world” were “familiar” with the kind
of reasoning employed by the English court.68 Further, the global license
imposed by the trial court did not usurp the “right of foreign courts to
decide issues of infringement and validity” in their own jurisdictions.69
While the FRAND license set by the trial court assumed the validity and
essentiality of those foreign patents, the license allowed for annual
adjustments in light of “any change in the patent landscape.”70
As with other courts that set global FRAND rates, the English court
also found itself ready to enjoin related foreign litigation.71 Following the
English FRAND determination, Huawei filed suit in China and asserted
that that Unwired Planet’s conduct had violated competition law and
64. Id. at 567. Indeed, during the course of the proceedings, the parties were involved in litigation
to China regarding the validity of Unwired Planet’s Chinese patents and litigation in Germany which
concerning both validity and infringement. Id. at 570.
65. Id. at 793.
66. Id. at 789.
67. Id. at 795.
68. Id. at 793.
69. Id. at 764.
70. Id. at 791. See also Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2018]
E.W.H.C. (Pat) 808, (Eng.), aff’d, [2019] E.W.C.A. (Civ.) 38 (following the reasoning of Unwired
Planet and, in addition, rejecting claims that that the case should be dismissed for reasons of forum
non conveniens). In Conversant, the English court found that it had jurisdiction to set global royalty
rates even though only 1% of Huawei’s sales were in the UK. Id. at 10. The Supreme Court of the
UK has agreed to hear Huawei’s appeal from the decisions in Unwired Planet and Conversant. See
Eingestellt Von Florian Mueller, Supreme Court of the UK Grants Huawei’s Petition to Appeal Lower
Court’s Claim to Global FRAND Jurisdiction in Unwired Planet Case, FLOSS PATENTS (Apr. 23,
2019, 3:09 PM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supreme-court-of-uk-grants-huaweis.html
[https://perma.cc/W73U-LXX7].
71. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. 2831 (Eng.).
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breached the contractual FRAND commitment.72 Moreover, Huawei
sought to have the Chinese court enjoin Unwired Planet from continuing
the English proceedings, and it argued that the English court’s decisions
themselves breached the FRAND commitment.73 At the same time,
Unwired Planet advanced parallel litigation against Huawei in Mexico.74
The parties eventually compromised on these matters, though the English
court stated that absent such compromise it would have granted an antisuit injunction.75
Outside of the judicial setting, some regulatory authorities have also
used the FRAND commitment to impose globally applicable obligations.
For example, in 2013, the Federal Trade Commission asserted that Google
and Motorola unlawfully sought injunctions against the infringement of
FRAND-committed patents, including through attempts to enjoin sales of
infringing Microsoft products in the Microsoft v. Motorola case discussed
above.76 The parties eventually reached a consent agreement which
limited the right of Google and Motorola to seek such injunctive relief.77
By its express terms, the consent agreement applied to all actions for an
injunction in any jurisdiction, and all patents of the companies
worldwide.78 Neither the FTC statement concerning the proposed order,
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Complaint, Motorola Mobility LLC, FTC File No. 121–0120 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013) (No. C-4410),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolacmpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZAW-ECJC].
77. Decision and Order, Motorola Mobility LLC, FTC File No. 121-0120 (F.T.C. July 24, 2013)
(No. C-4410), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724
googlemotorolado.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UZ5-QZMW] [hereinafter Google Consent Order]. The
Google Consent Order did not limit the companies’ right to seek injunctive relief against entities that
were outside the jurisdiction of the United States district courts. Id. at II(E)(1).
78. Id. at I(G) (defining “Covered Injunctive Relief” as any ruling “whether in or outside the United
States”); id. at I(R) (defining a “Patent Claim” covered by the Google Consent Order as patents or
applications “in the United States or anywhere else in the world”); see also Statement of Federal
Trade Commission, In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-0120, at 1 (Jan. 3,
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolastmt
ofcomm.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCJ6-L2QX] (noting that the Google Consent Order requires Google
to withdraw claim for injunctive relief “around the world”). Other FTC consent agreements have also
imposed similar extraterritorial restrictions with respect to FRAND-commitment patents.
See Decision and Order, Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No. 121-0081, at IV.E (Apr. 23, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9YX-V4B8] (prohibiting the company from initiating any “Action” demanding
injunctive relief for certain FRAND-committed patents, where “Action” was defined to include any
means of dispute resolution “in the United States or anywhere else in the world”); Decision and Order,
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. 051-0094, Docket No. C-4234 (Sept. 22,

09 - Greenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL

10/1/2019 3:28 PM

1097

nor the dissenting statement of one of the commissioners, addressed the
consent order’s worldwide scope or questioned whether a United States
agency should impose remedies with respect to foreign patents.79
In sum, both courts and regulatory agencies have asserted jurisdiction
to determine parties’ obligations under the FRAND commitment on a
global basis. In particular, national courts have claimed jurisdiction to
resolve multinational FRAND disputes by setting worldwide royalty
rates, and this assertion of authority has led such courts to interfere with
the processes of foreign litigation. The next Part elaborates on the
conflicts and complications caused when courts, without the parties’
agreement, assert jurisdiction to resolve the multinational conflict.
B.

Complications

The assertion of judicial authority to resolve multinational FRAND
disputes can raise a host of practical and theoretical problems. This Part
locates the origin of these difficulties in the lack of a forum selection
clause in the typical contractual FRAND commitment. A forum selection
clause could serve as a jurisdictional anchor tying FRAND disputes to a
specific dispute resolution process, but the absence of which allows any
national court to claim jurisdiction to resolve the multinational dispute.80
This Part then discusses the many conflicts and complications that emerge
from this lack of an established dispute resolution process and the
resulting judicial assertions of jurisdiction to consolidate a multinational
FRAND dispute into a single forum. These complications include
challenges to international comity, the problem of forum shopping and the
difficulty of applying the national laws and policies of one particular
jurisdiction across a number of countries.
2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080923ndsdo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KSM3-NCU4] (defining “Action” to include any means of dispute resolution “in
the United States or anywhere else in the world”).
79. See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 78; Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc.,
FTC File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases
/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaohlhausenstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDD3-RCEV]; Douglas H.
Ginsburg & John M. Taladay, Comity’s Enduring Vitality in a Globalized World, 24 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1069, 1087 (2017) (criticizing a “global remedy” imposed by the Korean Fair Trade
Commission regarding Qualcomm’s FRAND licensing practices); Koren Wong-Ervin et al., ExtraJurisdictional Remedies Involving Patent Licensing, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Dec. 14, 2016
(criticizing the extra-jurisdictional reach of the Google Consent Order).
80. See also Rose Hughs, Britannia Rules on SEPs — But is it FRAND?, THE IPKAT (Feb. 21,
2019), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/02/Britannia-rules-on-seps-but-is-it-frand.html
[https://perma.cc/B393-RB94] (asserting that “the heart of the problem is the reluctance of standardsetting organizations . . . to agree to a dispute resolution mechanism”).
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Agreements between sophisticated commercial parties often contain a
“forum selection clause.”81 Such contractual clauses allow parties to
choose the forum that will adjudicate disputes under the agreement, and
such clauses may specify a particular national court or adopt alternative
means of dispute resolution such as arbitration.82 United States courts will
ordinarily respect the parties’ choice of forum, especially when the
dispute arises between well-advised commercial entities.83 Courts and
commentators recognize the importance of forum selection clauses—such
provisions limit uncertainty and litigation costs by allowing contracting
parties to agree on the forum for dispute resolution.84 Forum selection
clauses also encourage international trade, since parties of diverse
nationalities can transact business with an understanding of which judicial
forum will assert jurisdiction over the transaction.85
FRAND commitments are significant contractual obligations—the
patentee makes binding commitments to the standard-setting organization
regarding how patents will be licensed and litigated, and these
commitments can be enforced by third parties that wish to use the patented
technologies.86 However, unlike other weighty commercial agreements,
FRAND commitments do not ordinarily specify a particular forum for the
resolution of disputes regarding the commitment’s interpretation.87 In
81. See generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 446 (6th ed. 2018).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 452; Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (holding that a forum
selection clause should generally control, especially when “made in an arm’s-length negotiation by
experienced and sophisticated businessmen”).
84. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (courts should support forum selection clauses since they “spare litigants unnecessary
costs . . . [and] relieve courts of time-consuming pretrial motions”); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva
Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 422 (1991).
85. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 (Refusing to enforce forum selection clauses “would be a heavy hand on
the future development of international commercial dealings by Americans. We cannot have trade
and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts.”).
86. Courts have held that the FRAND commitment constitutes a binding contract, which can be
enforced by an implementer of the relevant technology standard. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. 2012); see, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
87. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the
ITU patent policy does not contain a forum selection clause). A minority of standard-setting
organizations do specify that disputes should be resolved by arbitration. See Jorge L. Contreras &
David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes,
2014 J. DISP. RESOL., 23, 29–30 (2014) (detailing the “handful” of bylaws and policies of standardsetting organizations that specify arbitration as a means of dispute resolution). Forum selection
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such circumstances, no contractual roadblock stops a court that wishes to
assert jurisdiction over the matter. Indeed, given that technology covered
by FRAND commitments can be made available worldwide, any number
of courts could, in principle, assert jurisdiction over part of a FRAND
dispute. Such courts could also—and, as summarized above, sometimes
do—claim jurisdiction to resolve the FRAND dispute on a worldwide
basis.88 In other words, in the absence of an agreed dispute resolution
process, the authority that has already been asserted by certain courts to
impose global resolutions in transnational FRAND disputes could be
claimed by any jurisdiction.89
This lack of an established dispute resolution process, which allows
multiple courts to insert themselves into the same FRAND dispute, can
result in a number of unhappy complications. First, from the most
practical perspective, the involvement of multiple courts could result in
inconsistent decisions.90 Different courts could impose different monetary
royalties for the same activities, leaving litigants with confusion as to
which rate should be followed. Courts can also provide for inconsistent
non-monetary remedies—injunctions granted by foreign authorities have
already been perceived by United States courts as incompatible with the
American adjudication of a FRAND dispute.91 Moreover, litigants could
themselves try to exploit such inconsistencies—a party unhappy with the

clauses should be distinguished from “choice of law” clauses, which specify the law chosen by the
parties to govern a contract. The policies of several standard-setting organizations incorporate choice
of law clauses. For example, the intellectual property rights policy of the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) specifies that it shall be “governed by the laws of
France.” European Telecomms. Standards Inst., ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, ETSI 44
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAV8Z7LK] [hereinafter ETSI Patent Policy]. It is notable that open source licenses, which like FRAND
commitments provide licenses to intellectual property rights on a non-discriminatory basis, also do
not typically include forum selection clauses. See ANDREW M. ST. LAURENT, UNDERSTANDING OPEN
SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE LICENSING 178 (Simon St. Laurent ed., 2004).
88. See supra Part I.A.
89. No judicial authority can enforce its decision worldwide, but, as in Unwired Planet, a court
could back up a global royalty determination with the threat to enjoin infringing products from its
own jurisdiction. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. Such a threat of exclusion from a
major commercial center may be powerful enough incentive to compel compliance with that global
rate determination. Id.
90. Indeed, according to the United States Supreme Court, the potential for conflict between United
States and foreign laws is a principal reason for the statutory presumption against the extraterritorial
effect of United States law. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting
that the presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations”).
91. See supra notes 29–33, 43–45 and accompanying text.
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result in one jurisdiction could try its luck in another country, hoping for
a more favorable outcome in the latter jurisdiction.92
Second, this potential for judicial inconsistencies reflects a deeper
challenge to notions of international comity. FRAND disputes begin with
a contractual undertaking to license, but they go beyond that private
contractual commitment to involve complexities of patent and
competition law and policy.93 Each country’s domestic patent and
competition law reflects the nuances of its own economic policy choices.94
A court that seizes the authority to determine a global dispute undermines
the authority of other jurisdictions to make their own domestic economic
policy and provokes conflict if those foreign jurisdictions attempt to
reclaim their own power. In the same vein, judicial interference in the
affairs of other countries (for example, through an antisuit injunction) also
tests principles of international reciprocity. If American courts thwart the
effectiveness of injunctions issued by foreign authorities concerning their
own foreign patent rights, the chances are lessened that those foreign
authorities will themselves recognize judicial determinations from the
United States.95
These challenges to international comity are not limited to the financial
issue of royalty rates. FRAND determinations rest not only on cold
economic calculus, but also on the particular social or political bedrock of
the jurisdiction making the royalty calculations. In the United States, for
example, FRAND royalties may be set by an opaque jury verdict, rather

92. For example, subsequent to the trial court’s determination of global royalty rates in Unwired
Planet, Huawei turned to Chinese courts and asserted that the United Kingdom courts “hijacked the
determination of the FRAND licence” and that Unwired Planet had violated Chinese competition law
and its FRAND obligations. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C.
2831 p. 9 (Eng.).
93. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (stating that foreign patent
law “may embody different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors, competitors, and
the public in patented inventions”) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 28, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (No. 05-1056)); F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (noting that extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust laws “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability
independently to regulate its own commercial affairs”). See also Ginsburg & Taladay, supra note 79,
at 1086 (describing the importance of international comity in the enforcement of antitrust laws).
95. Cf. Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 29–30, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (detailing how the expansive
assertions of jurisdiction by United States courts caused foreign jurisdiction to curtail the recognition
accorded to United States judicial orders).
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than the reasoned decision of a judge.96 United States courts may also
structure or exclude the presentation of evidence in order not to “mislead
the jury,” while the same evidence may be available to the decision maker
in other jurisdictions.97 Jurisdiction-specific values may also be
incorporated in decisions regarding the non-discrimination aspect of
FRAND. For example, Unwired Planet’s understanding and application
of the FRAND non-discrimination commitment was to a large extent
informed by European Union (EU) competition law—a body of law
specific to the social and political conditions of EU.98 In contrast, at least
one United States court has asserted that American antitrust law
“provide[s] no guide” to understanding the FRAND non-discrimination
commitment.99 In sum, FRAND royalty determinations can go beyond
technocratic financial calculations to involve moral, cultural and political
elements tied to a specific jurisdiction. A forum that takes control of a
global FRAND dispute, with all the associated elements of innovation,
competition and economic policy, presumes the authority to impose its
own values worldwide.
Third, judicial enthusiasm for global FRAND rate determinations may
also encourage forum shopping and drive harmful competition between
jurisdictions. Parties faced with multiple possible jurisdictions will of
course look to file in the forum most favorable to their own position.
Patentees will hasten to file suit with courts that impose hefty FRAND
royalties or that issue punishing injunctions.100 On the other hand,
96. See, e.g., Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., No. 15-634-JFB,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70752, at *16 (D. Del. April 24, 2019) (finding that “the jury verdict reflects
an appropriate determination of the FRAND royalty rate and the Court will not supplant the jury’s
determination”). See generally Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-3451-RMW,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81678 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2014) (upholding jury determination of FRAND
rates); Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110585 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2013) (same).
97. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (in presenting damages
evidence to the jury, “care must be taken to avoid misleading the jury by placing undue emphasis on
the value of the entire product”); see also Norman v. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially
Determined FRAND Royalties, in TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 3, at 366.
98. Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many
Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, at 6 (the reasoning of
Unwired Planet “seems to conflate the competition law effects of violating a FRAND commitment
and the private ‘contractual’ meaning of the FRAND commitment itself”).
99. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341 JVS
(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *165 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2017). For a broader discussion
of the differences between (and different values underlying) European and United States competition
law, see Ginsburg & Taladay, supra note 79, at 1070–75.
100. See, e.g., Pat Treacy & Edwin Bond, What Every SEP Owner and Licensee Needs to Know
About the Unwired Planet Decision, IAM (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.iammedia.com/frandseps/bristows-unwired-planet [https://perma.cc/EB93-TRSM] (Following the
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manufacturers and implementers will rush to courts that minimize the
FRAND royalty burden or disfavor injunctive relief. This “race to the
courthouse,” by driving parties to quickly file suit in their preferred
jurisdiction, can encourage litigation and throw cold water on talk of
negotiated resolutions.101 Moreover, jurisdictions may also try to attract
litigation business by tailoring their law and procedures in order to appeal
to certain kinds of litigants.102 This can result in a “race to the bottom,”
with authorities adopting increasingly inefficient legal frameworks in
order to outshine competing jurisdictions.103
The possibility of forum shopping also raises the question of whether
courts and regulatory authorities will favor local technology companies.
There is some evidence that, in FRAND disputes, authorities support
domestic firms against foreign interests.104 As such, litigants looking for
a sympathetic forum may run to their home jurisdiction, which may try to
impose global FRAND rates that other jurisdictions perceive as unfair,
one-sided, or discriminatory.105 Even if that home jurisdiction does not
deliberately favor its native companies, the FRAND policies applied by
the judiciary and regulators of that country may naturally be more suitable
for its own domestic technology ecosystem. For example, businesses from
developed countries may boast strong intellectual property portfolios, and
their home jurisdictions may correspondingly defend intellectual property
by imposing relatively high royalty rates and enjoining unlawful
infringement.106 In contrast, developing countries may be more concerned
decision in Unwired Planet, patentees will “see the UK as attractive for FRAND litigation. It gives
SEP owners a means of resolving global disputes where the implementer has sufficient UK sales to
want to stay in the UK market”).
101. Contreras, supra note 16, at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. See also J. Gregory Sidak, The FRAND Contract, 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 1, 1 (2018)
(arguing that several “jurisdictions are competing in a tournament of sorts to identify the best legal
framework for resolving FRAND licensing disputes”).
103. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2016)
(claiming that “efforts to attract litigation are socially undesirable because they are likely to produce
inefficient pro-plaintiff law”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444 (1992) (describing
how the “race to the bottom theory claims that state competition for corporate charters harms
shareholders by driving states” to adopt harmful legal rules).
104. See generally Benjamin C. Li, The Global Convergence of FRAND Licensing Practices:
Towards “Interoperable” Legal Standards, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 429, 458–61 (2016).
105. Id. (describing FRAND decisions in the United States, China and South Korea that could be
perceived as discriminatory against foreign businesses).
106. See, e.g., Michael Murphree & Dan Breznitz, Standards, Patents and National
Competitiveness, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPER SERIES NO. 40, Sept.
2016, at 1, 7 (describing how the interests of developed and developing countries differ with respect
to FRAND policies); Xuan Li & Baisheng An, IPR Misuse: The Core Issue in Standards and Patents,
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with local technology diffusion and may therefore establish lighter royalty
payments.107 This global diversity of intellectual property policies can
exacerbate the stakes of forum shopping, since the policies of any
individual country may not be appropriate for a worldwide resolution of
a FRAND dispute across all jurisdictions.
All of these issues of consistency, comity, and forum shopping take on
greater importance in the FRAND arena, where the great majority of
license agreements are settled through private negotiation rather than
litigation.108 The potential for inconsistency and forum shopping muddles
the legal background rules governing the FRAND commitment, and
thereby makes it more difficult to successfully negotiate FRAND
licensing agreements.109 While all commercial bargaining walks through
the “shadow of the law”—in which the prospect of litigation looms over
and influences negotiations—FRAND negotiators also fear the
constraints of the ex ante FRAND licensing commitment.110 That
SOUTH CENTER RESEARCH PAPERS NO. 21, 23 (2009) (describing FRAND policy recommendations
for developing countries).
107. Murphree & Breznitz, supra note 106, at 7 (describing China’s interest in pursuing lower
FRAND royalties).
108. See generally Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of
Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 924 (2014) (asserting
that “thousands of licensing agreements covering SEPs” are “adopted every year through bilateral
negotiations”); Pierre Larouche et al., Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?, 10 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 581, 582 (2014)
(asserting that “[t]housands of license negotiations involving FRAND-committed SEPs have occurred
successfully”); D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 71,
73 (2013) (observing that “the overwhelming majority of license agreements determined through
bilateral negotiations without the need for any dispute resolution process”).
109. Mark D. Rosen, Choice-of-Law as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017,
1077 (2015) (unpredictability as to choice-of-law means that parties “will be unable to conform their
actions to legal requirements, or to intelligently bargain in the shadow of the law”); Christopher A.
Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 742 (2009)
(noting that “relative certainty about which law a judge will apply can facilitate bargaining”). The
legal uncertainty created by forum-shopping in patent cases was a central justification for the creation
of the Federal Circuit. See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 631 (2015).
110. The widely used metaphor of the “shadow” of the law is usually attributed to Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950 (1979). The metaphor symbolizes the impact of background legal rules and process on
“negotiations and bargaining that occur outside of the courtroom.” Id. at 950; see also Melamed &
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2114 (observing that FRAND licensing negotiations are “heavily influenced”
by the parties “predictions as to what the court will do if they cannot agree”); Suzanne Michel,
Bargaining For RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 893
(2011) (asserting that possible judicial remedies provide “the framework within which the parties
bargain for a RAND royalty amount”); Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in
Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 682 (noting that in patent disputes “settlement and licensing occur
in the shadow of expected trial outcomes”).
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commitment provides a mandatory framework for licensing
negotiations—bargaining outside the framework’s permitted compass
could be taken as a violation of the FRAND contract, and agreements that
break through the FRAND constraints could be later undone by a court.111
However, uncertainty as to how the FRAND commitment will be
interpreted makes it more difficult for the parties to agree on whether any
specific negotiating position complies with the ex-ante FRAND
constraints. This uncertainty increases the probability of litigation, and it
makes licensing negotiations more difficult to conclude.
In sum, when courts inflict a global FRAND resolution on parties that
have not consented to such jurisdiction, they also raise concerns of comity
and fears of forum shopping. This can encourage parties to race towards
litigation, and it may incentivize individual jurisdictions to adopt
inefficient FRAND policies in a quest for litigation business. Moreover,
these concerns create significant uncertainty as to the resolution of future
FRAND disputes since parties are less able to predict which legal regime
will be applied to resolve the transnational conflict. This lack of clarity
can hinder parties from reaching mutually acceptable royalty agreements,
and it increases the probability that such disputes will end up in litigation
before the courts.
C.

Jurisdiction

Even if the consolidation of multinational FRAND litigation into a
single forum presents the most efficient path to the global resolution of
disputes, that path may not always be accessible through the federal courts
of the United States. FRAND disputes typically implicate substantive
issues of patent law. United States courts, however, have generally shied
away from adjudicating disputes concerning foreign patent rights. As
such, in many circumstances, United States federal courts may decline
jurisdiction over the foreign aspects of a global FRAND dispute and may
be required to abstain from setting foreign royalty rates. While neither the
Microsoft nor the TCL Court addressed this jurisdiction question, in both
cases the litigants had consented to the court’s determination of FRAND
111. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding jury
finding that Motorola breached its contractual FRAND obligation by making unreasonable offers in
negotiation); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV
14-341 JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *180 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) (finding that
Ericsson’s licensing offers did not breach the contractual FRAND obligations). In the European
Union, parties must negotiate FRAND licenses according to specific, choregraphed steps in order to
preserve their rights. See generally Nadine Hermann, Injunctions in Patent Litigation Following the
CJEU Huawei v ZTE Ruling (Germany), 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 582 (2018).
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rates.112 By contrast, in the recent FRAND litigation between Samsung
and Huawei, the court noted the possibility that the court “would not be
able to decide a FRAND rate for the parties’ global portfolios” but only
“have the ability to determine a FRAND rate for U.S. SEPs.”113
In the words of the Supreme Court, United States district courts are
“courts of limited jurisdiction,” and can only hear cases as authorized by
the Constitution and statutes.114 While the Patent Act invests federal
courts with jurisdiction to hear actions “arising under any Act of Congress
relat[ed] to patents,”115 there are no federal statutes authorizing federal
courts to hear disputes arising under the foreign patent laws.116 Other
jurisdictional hooks potentially authorizing federal courts to adjudicate
issues of foreign patent law include the statutory rubrics of “supplemental
jurisdiction”117 or “diversity jurisdiction.”118 However, as shown below,
case law has repeatedly limited the competence of federal courts to
adjudicate matters of foreign patent law under these other jurisdictional
rubrics. As such, to the extent setting worldwide FRAND royalty rates
requires a determination of issues under foreign patent law, federal courts
may decline to adjudicate such matters.
For example, the Federal Circuit has limited the authority of courts to
employ “supplemental jurisdiction” to adjudicate matters of foreign patent
law. Generally, supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear
claims that “form part of the same case or controversy” of other claims
properly before the court.119 As such, in principle, supplemental
jurisdiction could allow federal courts to hear cases involving tightly
related questions of United States and foreign patent law—for example,
determining the validity of counterpart foreign patents for purposes of
setting a global FRAND royalty. However, in the 2007 case of Voda v.
112. Microsoft, 795 F.3d, at 1037–40 (discussing the parties’ consent to the determination of
RAND royalties by a bench trial); TCL Commc’n, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *10 (noting that
the “the parties agree that the present FRAND action should resolve their global licensing dispute”).
Despite the parties’ agreement, the courts may have been required to examine the issue sua sponte.
See generally Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (courts obligated to
“police compliance” with jurisdictional rules “sua sponte”).
113. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63052, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018).
114. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1, at 277–83 (6th ed. 2012).
115. 28 U.S.C § 1338(a) (2012).
116. See, e.g., Stein Assoc. v. Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that
“[o]nly a British court, applying British law, can determine validity and infringement of British
patents”).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
118. Id. § 1332(a).
119. Id. § 1367(a).
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Cordis,120 the Federal Circuit held that important values weigh against the
American adjudication of foreign patent claims.121 In Voda, the district
court first held that it had supplemental jurisdiction to resolve claims of
infringement of patents issued in Canada, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union.122 The Federal Circuit reversed,
asserting that considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness generally required federal courts to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over foreign patent claims.123 According to the Federal
Circuit, “a patent right . . . only arises from the legal right granted and
recognized by the sovereign within whose territory the right is located.”124
The court held that “[i]t would be incongruent to allow the sovereign
power of one to be infringed or limited” by another sovereign.125 In
addition, the court noted that it lacked “institutional competence” in
foreign patent law.126 As such, according to the Federal Circuit, hearing
foreign patent claims would not be particularly efficient and could result
in “at least the same magnitude of litigation” as filing infringement claims
in each applicable territory.127
Subsequent to Voda, at least one federal district court has held that it
does not have supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate the parts of a
FRAND dispute touching on foreign patents. Optis Wireless Tech., LLC
v. Huawei Techs. Co.128 involved a FRAND dispute between two Texas
companies. The patentee sought a declaratory judgement from the United
States court that it had complied with its worldwide FRAND
commitments—noting that foreign courts themselves are “increasingly
making global FRAND determinations.”129 The district court, however,
declined to assert jurisdiction over the claim, holding that a determination
120. 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 898 (pointing to “considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
other exceptional circumstances” as “compelling reasons to decline” supplemental jurisdiction to
adjudicate foreign patent infringement claims). See also Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third
Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 (D. Me. 2008) (holding that Voda means
that “it is almost always an abuse of discretion to use that supplemental power to deal with
infringement claims involving foreign patents”).
122. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28102, at *3 (W.D. Okla.,
Aug. 2, 2004), rev’d, 476 F.3d 887, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
123. Voda, 476 F.3d at 898.
124. Id. at 902.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 903.
127. Id.
128. No. 2:17-cv-00123-JRG-RSP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115100 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2018).
129. Id. at *25.
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of whether a party had breached its FRAND obligations would require an
assessment of foreign law “governing FRAND compliance and royalty
rate determinations.”130 Hearing such claims would be similar to
adjudicating “a foreign infringement claim” with respect to foreign
patents.131 As such, following Voda’s command, the court declined to
assert supplemental jurisdiction over the foreign aspects of the FRAND
dispute.132
Diversity jurisdiction also does not provide a secure basis to ensure that
federal courts adjudicate the foreign elements of FRAND disputes.
Generally, diversity jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear cases
between parties that are “diverse”—for example, between citizens of
different states.133 Unlike supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts in most
cases do not formally have the discretion to decline to hear cases that come
under diversity jurisdiction.134 Federal courts faced with diverse litigants
could thus, in principle, be required to adjudicate claims concerning
foreign patent rights—again, for example, to set global FRAND rates.
Even so, the Federal Circuit has stated that claims concerning the
infringement of foreign patents may be dismissed under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.135 Under that doctrine, a court with subject matter
jurisdiction may nonetheless decline to hear a claim if the forum is
inappropriate, and factors to be considered in determining the proprietary
of the forum’ include concerns of comity and difficulties in applying
foreign law.136 Accordingly, as per the Federal Circuit, the complexities
of foreign patent law can justify the dismissal of a claim over which the
courts would otherwise have diversity jurisdiction.137
As such, under current law, whether a federal court would accept
diversity jurisdiction over the foreign aspects of a FRAND dispute
depends on the particular circumstances of each case. On the one hand,
the Federal Circuit has often viewed contractual licensing disputes
through the prism of patent law, and allocated jurisdiction over such cases
130. Id. at *23.
131. Id.
132. See also Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., No. C 11-01036 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 160370 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (declining to find supplementary jurisdiction to adjudicate
the scope of foreign patent claims in a dispute over the interpretation of a license agreement).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).
134. See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 587
(1985) (asserting that “a wholesale refusal by the federal courts to adjudicate diversity
cases . . . simply cannot be reconciled with the congressional grant of authority”).
135. Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
136. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981).
137. Mars, 24. F.3d at 1376.
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accordingly.138 That perspective of the Federal Circuit would be broadly
consistent with a recognition that the foreign elements of FRAND
litigation subsume related disputes under foreign patent law, and that it
would not be appropriate for a United States court to adjudicate those
foreign disputes and associated FRAND issues. On the other hand, at least
one United States district court has found that a court with diversity
jurisdiction must adjudicate a contract dispute that could potentially
involve the interpretation of foreign patents.139 That case, however,
involved a dispute between two United States companies and a contract
that selected a United States forum for dispute resolution.140 In contrast,
FRAND contests frequently involve disputes with and between foreign
companies, and FRAND commitments do not usually specify any
jurisdiction for dispute resolution.141
In sum, even if foreign courts are prepared to seize jurisdiction to
impose global FRAND royalties, United States courts may not have the
power to make such determinations. Given the choice between forums
that can only provide piecemeal, territorially limited adjudication, and
other arenas that promise to resolve a global dispute, some litigants may
prefer to press their claims in the latter jurisdictions.142 In that event,
American FRAND rates may in many situations be determined by foreign

138. The Federal Circuit has frequently held that the federal courts have original jurisdiction over
contractual licensing disputes that require a determination of patent validity or infringement,
reasoning that such contractual disputes hinge substantially on determinations of patent law. See Jang
v. Boston Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014); U.S. Valves Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). But see MDS (Can.), Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2013)
(contract claims requiring a determination of infringement do not arise under the patent laws). Often,
the contractual connection to substantive patent law is tightened by the language of the contract, since
a contract may link the payment of royalties to whether a patent is valid and infringed. Jang, 767 F.3d
at 1337 (noting “the extent to which validity is made relevant to the resolution of the breach-ofcontract claim by the language of the contract itself”). In the same way, FRAND commitments often
hang on whether the relevant patent is valid, standard-essential or infringed. See ETSI Patent Policy,
supra note 87, § 15.6 (tying the definition of whether a patent is essential to whether certain actions
infringe that patent).
139. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, 589 F. Supp. 2d 84,
99–100 (D. Me. 2008). See also Baker-Bauman v. Walker, No. 3:06cv017, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23080 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2007) (exercising diversity jurisdiction over infringement claims under
Australian and Chinese patents).
140. Fairchild, 589. F. Supp. 2d at 100; see also Au New Haven, LLC v. YKK Corp., No. 15-CV3411, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77804, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2018) (holding that despite Voda the
court can interpret the scope of a Japanese patent in the context of a dispute over interpretation of a
license agreement, since the parties “expressly agreed to litigate all disputes related to the” license
agreement “in New York courts”).
141. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
142. See Contreras, supra note 16, at 755–56; Treacy & Bond, supra note 100.
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courts, and United States courts may in those cases lose the opportunity
to determine FRAND rates for the domestic American market.143
II.

THE AWKWARD FIT OF ARBITRATION

Given the complications of consolidating multinational FRAND
disputes, some commentators and regulatory agencies have suggested that
such conflicts could be most efficiently resolved through international
arbitration.144 While such assertions have mostly focused on the potential
cost savings offered by arbitration, in principle, arbitration also offers the
parties a means of skirting the jurisdictional squabbles of multinational
FRAND litigation.145 If FRAND litigants agree to arbitrate their dispute,
they could consolidate all claims worldwide into a single, comprehensive
proceeding. The so-called New York Convention provides an
international infrastructure for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards.146 As such (goes the argument), an agreement to arbitrate a global
FRAND dispute, and the ensuing arbitral determination of global FRAND
royalty rates, would, pursuant to the Convention, be recognized and
enforced in all major jurisdictions. In other words, international
arbitration offers a ready and recognized means for the resolution of

143. Cf. Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 2:17-cv-00123-JRG-RSP, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115100, at *25 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2018) (rejecting plaintiff’s arguments that
“foreign courts are increasingly making global FRAND determinations, and it would be unfair if
United States courts did not follow that trend”).
144. See generally Contreras & Newman, supra note 87, at 23 (listing parties recommending the
use of arbitration to resolve FRAND disputes); Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: Setting Out the EU
Approach
to
Standard
Essential
Patents,
at
11
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native
[https://perma.cc/G6T5-D8ZK] (arbitration and mediation offer “offer swifter and less costly dispute
resolution”). Indeed, a minority of Standard Development Organizations already incorporate
mandatory forum selection and dispute resolution clauses in their intellectual property policies. See
Contreras & Newman, supra note 87 passim.
145. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1163–64 (asserting that arbitration of FRAND disputes
can “moot” comity concerns in multinational FRAND disputes); MUNICH IP DISPUTE RESOLUTION
FORUM, FRAND ADR CASE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 16 (2018) [hereinafter Munich FRAND
ADR
Guidelines],
http://www.ipdr-forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/frandguidelines_helvetica_rz6_klein_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4KY-TPVN](asserting that referring a
FRAND dispute to arbitration “makes it possible to obtain a global solution”).
146. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See also NIGEL
BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 61 (6th ed. 2015)
(describing the importance of the New York Convention to the recognition and enforcement of
international arbitration).
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transnational disputes, and this structure could also be employed to bring
FRAND royalty disputes to a comprehensive, global conclusion.147
Nevertheless, despite the advantages of an agreed arbitral process,
arbitration should not be the default option for the resolution of
multinational FRAND disputes. Conflicts regarding the magnitude of
FRAND royalties can incorporate commercial, legal, and policy
complexities that are inappropriate for arbitration, either because the
resolution of those issues requires prior (and perhaps unachievable)
agreement on the parameters of the arbitral process, or because those
issues touch on non-arbitrable matters of public concern. As a result, in
many circumstances arbitration will not be able to provide a final,
conclusive resolution of the dispute, and closure will in any event require
litigation in national courts. Standard-setting organizations, perhaps for
these reasons, have generally not mandated that FRAND royalty disputes
be resolved through arbitration.148 The following sections catalog the
complexities of consolidating FRAND disputes through arbitration—
section A spotlights issues connected to patent validity and infringement,
section B focuses on matters of antitrust and competition law, and section
C looks at the complications of constructing a generally applicable arbitral
framework for FRAND conflicts.
A.

Patent Validity and Infringement

Mandating the use of arbitration for the resolution of FRAND disputes
would require consensus on an acceptable arbitral framework. Most
importantly, participants would need to decide whether to incorporate
challenges to patent validity and determinations of infringement in any
agreed arbitral process.149 Consensus on this matter, however, has, to date,
147. Arbitration also offers other well-known advantages. For multinational FRAND disputes, for
example, arbitration allows the party to aim for neutrality, expertise, flexibility, and confidentiality in
the dispute resolution process. In addition, a responsive arbitral process may be able to assist the
parties in customizing an appropriate resolution, including coming to a mutual agreement on the
broader structure of a full FRAND license agreement. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,
No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187878, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2012) (asserting that
binding arbitration would allow the parties to resolve the dispute since they would “be able to
negotiate any and all of the many aspects of their licensing agreement”). Analysis of these other
purported advantages of FRAND arbitration is beyond the scope of this Article.
148. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 87, at 29–30 (listing a “handful” of standard-setting
organizations that require dispute resolution through arbitration).
149. Litigants may also dispute whether “essentiality” should be considered within the arbitral
proceedings—whether a patent declared by one of the litigants as “standard-essential” is correctly
described as such. For reasons why litigants may wish to dispute patent essentiality separately from
the question of infringement, see Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standard Essential Patents, in
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 3, at 209, 225.
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eluded participants in the standard-setting process. On the one hand,
addressing questions of validity and infringement within the arbitral
framework is necessary to achieve a full resolution of the dispute. Indeed,
manufacturers have balked at participating in proposed arbitral
frameworks in which these issues were not addressed.150 On the other
hand, the determination of validity and infringement for even a single
patent ordinarily requires lengthy and expensive litigation, and the cost of
arbitrating these issues across an entire portfolio would seem to
undermine much of the efficiencies that could be achieved through arbitral
proceedings.151 Perhaps reflecting the difficulty of coming to a consensus
on these questions, proposed institutional frameworks for FRAND
arbitration have not taken a definitive position regarding the extent to
which validity and infringement should be addressed in arbitration.152
150. For example, the Google Consent Order allowed FRAND royalty terms to be set through
arbitration. See Google Consent Order, supra note 77, at III.C.2 (providing that a potential licensee
may elect to have contested FRAND terms resolved through “Binding Arbitration”). Some
manufacturers expressed concern that the proposed arbitral process of the Google Consent Order
deviated from ordinary legal requirements to assess patent validity, essentiality, and infringement.
See Letter from E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Attn., Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, to Donald S. Clark,
Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n at 7 (Feb 22, 2013) [hereinafter Apple FTC Comments],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/2013/02/563708-0002985598.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU7G-QUKU] (requesting that the FTC clarify that “these issues [of
patent validity and infringement] must be decided in any arbitration” and that nothing in the Google
Consent Order should be understood to “shift the traditional burdens of proof” regarding these
matters); Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines, supra note 145, at 11 (noting that implementers
“particularly criticized” a proposed arbitration framework that limited assessments of patent validity,
essentiality and infringement). Objections to arbitral procedures that do not definitively settle issues
of validity may also come from patentees. See Larouche, supra note 108, at 602 (asserting that patent
owners will be undercompensated “in any world where arbitration is mandatory but validity
challenges are possible”).
151. Larouche, supra note 108, at 607 (claiming that “any purported efficiencies or cost savings
resulting from the arbitration are eliminated” if the procedure requires consideration of ancillary
issues such as patent validity); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1152 (noting that FRAND arbitral
procedures which allow for the presentation of evidence concerning validity and infringement will
not be “an easy matter” and will involve “extensive discovery”). Some commentators have suggested
that an efficient arbitral process need not make final determinations regarding patent validity, but
could instead simply take evidence regarding validity into account in setting a FRAND royalty rate.
See id.; Contreras, supra note 16, at 730 n.140. Notwithstanding the potential efficiencies of such a
process, it currently seems implausible that manufacturers would generally agree to a default arbitral
framework in which they waive their rights to challenge validity and infringement within the arbitral
process.
152. See, e.g., WIPO ARBITRATION & MEDIATION CTR., GUIDANCE ON WIPO FRAND
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) 7, https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs
/wipofrandadrguidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5VW-UFGH] (noting that “[i]n the interest of time and
cost-efficiency . . . the parties may agree to limit claims or defenses that they may bring in the ADR
proceedings, including patent essentiality, validity, infringement, and enforceability”); Eli Greenbaum,
Forgetting FRAND: The WIPO Model Submission Agreements, LES NOUVELLES, June 2015, at 81, 85
(noting that the template WIPO FRAND arbitration submission agreements “avoid creating specific rules
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Even if litigants were to agree on a mechanism for addressing patent
validity within the arbitral process, the resulting award may not be
enforceable in important jurisdictions. As such, it may be impossible to
consolidate an entire FRAND dispute into a single arbitration since some
jurisdictions will always allow parallel, and possibly duplicative,
litigation regarding patent validity in national courts. For example, China,
Germany, France, and the Netherlands all consider issues of patent
validity to involve non-arbitrable matters of public policy.153 As the New
York Convention does not require courts to enforce arbitral awards that
violate public policy, those countries are unlikely to enforce foreign
arbitral awards that make determinations regarding patent validity.154
Moreover, courts in those jurisdictions may refuse to stay local litigation
regarding patent validity even if the parties separately proceed with a
related FRAND arbitration.155 In other words, no agreed arbitral process
can provide a comprehensive, final pronouncement of judgement in
multinational FRAND disputes, since matters of patent validity will likely
remain as loose ends to be tied up through litigation in national courts.
Moreover, even if parties agree on a mechanism for the arbitration of
patent validity, and even if the relevant jurisdictions would enforce the
arbitral award, that award may need to be later reexamined. Many
countries that allow for the arbitration of patent validity only give inter
partes effect to the arbitral award.156 According to these jurisdictions the
determination of patent validity in the arbitral award would not control in
subsequent FRAND disputes with third parties, and in those subsequent
disputes the question of validity would need to be relitigated. This
requirement to revisit issues of patent validity will of course weigh down

to address . . . claims of invalidity in the FRAND context”); Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines, supra
note 145, at 26 (presenting a menu of options for addressing patent validity within an arbitration).
153. See generally M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues
Worldwide, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 305 (2006) (discussing the laws of a large “group of states”
that do “not allow the arbitration of claims involving the validity of a patent”).
154. See New York Convention, supra note 146, art. V(2)(b) (providing that “[r]ecognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award” may be refused if “contrary to the public policy”); Smith, supra
note 153, at 303 (noting that awards concerning patent validity might violate public policy in certain
jurisdictions).
155. Id.; supra note 146, art. II(3) (courts not required to refer parties to arbitration if it finds that
the agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”).
156. See M.A. Smith, supra note 153, at 305 (observing that in patent arbitration, “[t]he effect of
the award . . . generally remains inter partes. Thus, an arbitral tribunal award finding a patent invalid
generally will not preclude the enforcement of that patent against nonparties to the arbitration”); 35
U.S.C § 294(c) (2012) (“An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to
the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person.”).
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subsequent FRAND disputes with duplicative costs.157 More importantly,
however, the limited effect given to arbitral determinations of patent
validity conflicts with the FRAND “non-discrimination” requirement.
Though the meaning of the non-discrimination is open to interpretation,
at base it demands some manner of consistency between the commercial
terms granted to different licensees.158 However, that requirement may be
violated if, for example, a particular arbitral panel decides that a patent is
valid and awards royalties for its infringement, even as other licensees are
not required by subsequent decision-makers to make royalty payments for
the same patent.159 As such, any arbitral award may need to be
reconsidered in order to adjust the awarded FRAND rate in light of
subsequent decisions. This non-discrimination requirement, and the
possibility that any arbitral award will need to be repeatedly revisited,
would frustrate the consolidation of a FRAND dispute into a single
definitive, arbitral proceeding.
B.

Antitrust

Efforts to consolidate multinational proceedings through arbitration
may also be thwarted by the antitrust aspects of FRAND disputes. As
discussed above, FRAND disputes can include claims under domestic
antitrust and competition law.160 Many jurisdictions would allow for the
arbitration of such competition law claims.161 At the same time, however,

157. These costs may be higher in the FRAND context. FRAND-committed patents—being
essential to required technological standards—are typically the subject of numerous license
agreements, and are litigated more frequently than other patents. See generally Timothy Simcoe et
al., Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies,
18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 775 (2009).
158. Eli Greenbaum, Nondiscrimination in 5G Standards, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2018).
159. See, e.g., M.A. Smith, supra note 153, at 324 (noting that “[a] finding of invalidity” in
arbitration “amounts to a permanent license of the patent for the accused infringer: the arbitration is
binding under the doctrine of res judicata with respect to the accused infringer, and the patent may
still be enforced against nonparties”); cf. Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij BV v. Standard
Microsystems Corp., 925 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (beneficiary of a “Most Favored License”
clause claiming that the clause is triggered by an arbitral proceeding and ensuing agreement granting
another party “immunity from suit”).
160. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
161. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–40 (1985)
(allowing arbitration of antitrust claims under United States law). See also Vera Korzun, Arbitrating
Antitrust Claims: From Suspicion to Trust, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 867 (2016) (discussing the
arbitrability of antitrust claims in the United States and the European Union). Of course, participants
in the standard-setting process that intend to require arbitration of antitrust and competition law claims
need to draft the FRAND commitment in a manner that requires arbitration of such claims. See Zoran
Corp. v. DTS, Inc., No. C 08-4655 JF (HRL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6675, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20,
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countries also often see their domestic competition law as implicating core
issues of public policy.162 As such, as with matters of patent validity,
under the New York Convention countries may refuse to enforce arbitral
awards that their national courts view as inconsistent with domestic
competition policy.163 In addition, many jurisdictions provide that arbitral
awards regarding competition law do not have preclusive effect beyond
the parties to the arbitration.164 As discussed above, this lack of preclusive
effect may be fundamentally inconsistent with the FRAND nondiscrimination requirement and may result in the reexamination of arbitral
awards that conflict with subsequent decisions concerning the same
FRAND commitments. These issues, again as with matters of patent
validity, may preclude the consolidation of a FRAND dispute into a final,
comprehensive arbitral proceeding.
C.

Framework of the Arbitral Process

A generally applicable arbitral framework would require agreement on
the national law used to adjudicate the dispute, since the principles for
resolving FRAND disputes vary by country. For example, different
jurisdictions apply different methodologies for calculating FRAND
royalties and damages.165 Similarly, jurisdictions take diverse positions on

2009) (finding arbitration clause of a standard-setting organization was not drafted to require
arbitration of associated antitrust claims).
162. Korzun, supra note 161, at 906. See also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (holding that with respect
to the arbitration of antitrust claims, “the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity
at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws has been addressed”); Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines, supra note 145, at 17 (noting that in
Europe, “awards by arbiter tribunals in FRAND disputes must recognize competition law as a matter
of public policy”).
163. For example, under the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s decision in
Genentech v. Hoechst GmbH, No. C-567/14, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 40 (July 7, 2016), a
FRAND arbitral award may be challenged under European Union competition law if the award
provides for a license that cannot be terminated. In Genentech, the CJEU was asked to set aside an
arbitral award concerning patent royalties. The arbitral panel had held that a license agreement did
not violate European competition law by requiring the payment of royalties on patents that had
subsequently been found invalid. The CJEU held that the arbitral award did not violate European
competition law since the license agreement could be terminated. However, license agreements that
required payment of royalties on patents found invalid, and which did not include a right to terminate,
could be challenged under EU competition law.
164. See, e.g., Alexandra Theobald, Mandatory Antitrust Law and Multiparty International
Arbitration, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1059, 1066 (2016).
165. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 16, at 718–22 (listing “controversies” regarding the applicable
principles for the calculation of FRAND royalties); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co.
Ltd. [2017] E.W.H.C. (Pat) 711 p. 97 (rejecting the ex ante approach of United States courts to
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how strictly the FRAND non-discrimination requirement should be
interpreted.166 National law could, in principle, even differ as to whether
a FRAND commitment exists at all.167 In other words, in certain
situations, it may be difficult for an arbitral tribunal to identify sufficiently
concrete principles for assessing FRAND royalties without making
reference to specific national law.168 In trying to set out the framework for
a FRAND arbitration, each party would push for the governing law most
favorable to its position. This tug-of-war could be especially fierce in
multinational patent litigation between firms of different nationalities. A
generally applicable arbitral framework could be impossible to achieve if
the parties cannot even agree on what law should govern the dispute.169

FRAND royalty calculations, in which FRAND “represents the rate which would be agreed . . . before
the patented invention is adopted into the standard”).
166. Compare Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. (Pat) 711p. 501
(Eng.), aff’d, [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 (holding that the FRAND non-discrimination commitment
is not violated unless the different royalties paid by licensees would “distort competition” between
them), with TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341
JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *165 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (holding that
competition law provides “no guide to understanding ETSI’s non discrimination” commitment). See
also Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 p. 77 (presenting
Huawei’s arguments that Chinese approaches to the FRAND non-discrimination requirement differ
from the approach taken by the English court of first instance).
167. See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190051, at
*48 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) (holding that certain FRAND commitments required Qualcomm to
“license its SEPs to modem chip suppliers”). Qualcomm had contended that such a requirement was
contrary to “industry practice.” Id. at *43. Other jurisdictions could take a contrary position. See Jorge
Padilla & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices:
Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level,
62(3) THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 494, 507 (2017) (asserting that in many circumstances there may be
“no justification” for compelling an SEP holder to license on FRAND terms to component
manufacturers); see also LG Offered Nokia Privateer Conversant Less than 1% of the StandardEssential Patent License Fees It Demands—And Even That Turns Out Unwarranted, FOSS PATENTS
(Apr. 25, 2019) http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/lg-offered-nokia-privateer-conversant.html
[https://perma.cc/3VSF-78SV] (describing a French court’s holding that “FRAND licensing
obligations apply only to actually essential patents, not merely declared-essential ones” but that
“there’s an alternative approach according to which a patent holder’s FRAND declaration applies to
non-essential patents as well”).
168. See Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1816, 1819 (1988) (asserting that arbitral proceedings based on general principles of law rather
than specific national law “become unpredictable, and parties to agreements have little ground on
which to base their expectations”); Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An
Empirical Look At the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 533 (2005).
169. See, e g., Eli Greenbaum, Arbitration Without Law: Choice of Law in FRAND Disputes, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1 (2016) (describing an example of an international FRAND
arbitration where the parties from different jurisdictions could not agree on what national law should
apply to the determination of a FRAND royalty rate); Unwired Planet [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344
p. 78 (Eng.) (presenting Huawei’s arguments that the decision of the English court calculated royalties
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Moreover, disputes regarding the magnitude of FRAND royalties may
only be amenable to resolution within the context of a basic agreement on
license terms. Such license terms could include provisions of substantial
commercial importance—for example, the period covered by the license,
the relevant royalty base, and whether the licensee holds patents of
sufficient importance to make a cross-license (and a corresponding
reduction in royalty rates) valuable to the patentee.170 All of these terms
impact the commercial transaction’s rewards and therefore bear on the
magnitude of the FRAND royalties.171 As such, unless the disputants can
come to at least some initial agreement on a licensing framework, an
arbitral panel may not have any objective basis for choosing between any
of these commercial terms. In short, bringing a FRAND arbitration to a
successful conclusion requires the litigants to begin with an agreed,
workable outline for adjudicating disputed license terms. Using
arbitration as a default option for settling FRAND disputes, however, may
assume a level of cooperation between the parties that does not in fact
exist.172

and damages “on a different basis from that which the competent courts” of other jurisdictions “would
have adopted”).
170. Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187878, at
*17–18 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2012) (detailing the surrounding commercial terms necessary to assess a
FRAND rate); Apple and Google Disagree on Key Parameters of Potential FRAND Arbitration,
Including Scope, FOSS PATENTS (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/11/apple-andgoogle-disagree-on-key.html [https://perma.cc/3RPL-LTX7] (describing key disagreements between
Google and Apple regarding the scope of a possible arbitration to settle a FRAND dispute). See also
TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbologet LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-00341 JVS
(ANx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101920, at *15 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016) (noting that thirteen terms
of a license agreement, aside from the royalty rate, were disputed between the parties).
171. See J. Gregory Sidak, Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for StandardEssential Patents, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) (asserting that “licensing terms are
multifaceted and often include forms of consideration beyond the royalty itself” and “[t]o reduce the
entire dispute to a single number is not only arbitrary, but also not indicative of actual FRAND
terms”).
172. Some industry players offered the same criticisms regarding the proposed arbitral procedures
in the Google Consent Order. For example, Apple asserted that that the arbitral procedure could “fail
at the outset because the parties are unable to agree on the terms or scope of arbitration.” See Apple
FTC Comments, supra note 150, at 8. Qualcomm provided the FTC with similar comments. See
Qualcomm Inc.’s Response to the Commission’s Request for Comments on the Proposed Agreement
Containing Consent Order at 16, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC File
No.
121-0120
(Jan.
11,
2013),
[hereinafter
Qualcomm
FTC
Comments],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/2013/02/563708-0002285574.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UJX-2PWA] (“A license agreement, like any contract, must be
construed as a whole, with no term decided or interpreted in isolation.”). But see Lemley & Shapiro,
supra note 16, at 1144 n.26 (suggesting that in a FRAND arbitration, the arbitrator should not “resolve
disputes over other non-price license terms . . . the FRAND obligation doesn’t compel any such terms,
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In sum, international arbitration does not present a straightforward path
towards the unified resolution of FRAND disputes in a single
proceeding.173 But the obstacles that impede such arbitral consolidation
demonstrate two truths about the FRAND commitment. First, the FRAND
commitment implicates matters of public interest that can extend beyond
a private licensing dispute between two parties.174 Second, efforts at
dispute resolution can founder without national law to give jurisprudential
shape to both the substantive and procedural aspects of the FRAND
commitment, since the parties may not be able to agree on the framework
and scope of dispute resolution proceedings without the constraints of
national law. In other words, the meaning of the FRAND commitment
depends on background national law, and authorities in different
jurisdictions can require interpretations of the FRAND commitment to
respect broader public and normative demands. The difficulties of
creating a comprehensive FRAND arbitral framework shows that the
FRAND commitment cannot be extracted and given abstract meaning
outside of the structures of national law.175
III. TERRITORIAL ADJUDICATION
This Article proposes that FRAND commitments should be modified
to provide that, absent other agreement by the parties, the national courts
of each country will have jurisdiction for FRAND licensing
determinations only for patents issued by that territory. 176 Section A of
so the arbitrator should not have to resolve them”); Contreras, supra note 16, at 745 (proposing that
arbitrators determine only a FRAND royalty rate but no other commercial terms).
173. Perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of consolidating a global FRAND dispute into a single
arbitral proceeding, the Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines recommend that litigants consider
resolving the economic calculations of FRAND royalties through arbitration, even as national courts
retain jurisdiction to resolve issues of infringement, validity and essentiality. See Munich FRAND
ADR Guidelines, supra note 145, at 20.
174. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145835, at *53–54 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017) (noting that the licensing dispute between the two parties
involved matters of public policy and that “it is far from accurate to say that this is a paradigmatic
‘private contractual dispute’ that only implicates the rights and obligations among Apple and
Qualcomm . . . . [T]his dispute implicates global public concerns”).
175. Commentators have raised other concerns regarding the suitability of arbitration for the
resolution of FRAND disputes, including whether arbitral panels will properly value intellectual
property assets and whether arbitral panels will allow sufficient discovery. See generally Sidak, supra
note 171. Such concerns are beyond the scope of this Article.
176. The proposal for territorial adjudication advanced by this Article does not address the separate
question of which substantive law should be applied by national courts in FRAND disputes. Some
standard-setting organizations may provide for choice-of-law rules in their own patent policies. See supra
text accompanying note 87 (discussing the ETSI choice-of law clause). Nevertheless, after analyzing
applicable conflict of law rules, courts may nonetheless hold that the law specified by a patent policy is
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this Part discusses the advantages presented by the territorial adjudication
of FRAND claims. Section B addresses objections to territorial
adjudication that have been raised by courts and commentators. This
Article argues that while such objections may be compelling in the context
of general patent litigation, they have less salience in the FRAND setting.
For FRAND litigation, unless the parties agree otherwise, the nature of
the dispute presents no real alternative to territorial adjudication.
Moreover, as detailed in section C, the FRAND commitment itself
provides a means for mitigating the complexities and costs of jurisdictionby-jurisdiction litigation.177
Under this proposal, neither the English court in Unwired Planet nor
the United States district courts in Microsoft, TCL, and Samsung would
have possessed the authority to set global FRAND royalty rates. Rather,
the English court’s authority would have been limited to FRAND
determinations for United Kingdom patents, and the authority of the
Microsoft, TCL, and Samsung courts would have been limited to setting
royalty rates for United States patents. To the extent the litigating parties
not the law that should be used to calculate FRAND royalties. See Yangi Li & Nari Lee, European
Standards in Chinese Courts – A Case of SEP and FRAND Disputes in China, in GOVERNANCE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 266 (Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016) (describing how
Chinese courts calculated FRAND royalties under Chinese law, rather than the French law governing the
ETSI patent policy). It is also assumed that, regardless of whether a patent policy includes a choice-of-law
clause, jurisdictions will always apply their own domestic patent and competition laws. See, e.g., u-blox
AG v. InterDigital, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-001-CAB-(BLM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62816, at *6–9 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 11, 2019) (analyzing a breach of contract claim under the French law that governed the applicable
FRAND licensing commitment, but analyzing antitrust claims associated with the breach of such FRAND
commitment under United States antitrust law).
177. The American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed principles for the adjudication of
transnational intellectual property disputes and, consistent with the arguments presented by this
Article, such principles would also seem to disfavor the consolidation of a global FRAND royalty
dispute in a single jurisdiction. See generally AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. A “crucial factor” for permitting consolidation under the ALI
Principles is whether there exists a single court with jurisdiction to hear the entire dispute—which is
unlikely to be the case for FRAND disputes that involve multijurisdictional challenges to patent
validity, assessments of essentiality and infringement, and questions of competition law. Id. § 222,
Ill.2.c. Other factors weighing against consolidation under the ALI Principles include the risk of
inconsistent judgements and the risk that the “judgement resulting from consolidated proceedings will
[not] be enforceable in other [countries].” Id. § 222(1)(g)–(h). As noted above, a number of FRAND
disputes to date have resulted in inconsistent judgements and the cross-jurisdictional conflicts to date
present strong risks that a global FRAND determination in one jurisdiction will not be enforceable in
another territory. Moreover, the ALI Principles note that certain technical patent issues may best be
resolved in the jurisdiction where the patent right is registered. Id. § 222 cmt. 5. The ALI Principles
also note that cases which involve a multiplicity of claims (such as FRAND cases, which typically
involve related patent, antitrust, and contract claims) may not best be resolved by consolidating global
claims in one court. Id. § 221 cmt. c; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 834 (describing situations
where “litigation is best situated in each country in which rights are registered”).

09 - Greenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL

10/1/2019 3:28 PM

1119

could not agree on applicable royalty rates for other countries’ patents, the
parties would be required to bring their claims in the national courts of
those countries, and no national court would have jurisdiction over the
worldwide dispute. Of course, the parties would be free to agree on
alternative dispute resolution procedures, including resolution of the
global dispute by arbitration or by a specific national court that would
accept jurisdiction over the global matter.
These proposed jurisdictional limitations could be implemented
through the intellectual property policies of standard-setting bodies. As
noted, courts have held that FRAND commitments made pursuant to such
intellectual property policies are binding contracts, and that such contracts
can be enforced by implementers of the relevant technology standard.178
Currently, the majority of such intellectual property policies do not
specify a particular forum for dispute resolution. Such policies could be
modified to include a territorial forum selection clause—providing that,
absent other agreement, disputes would be resolved by the parties on the
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis detailed above.
A.

Advantages of Territorial Adjudication

The jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction resolution of FRAND disputes
presents clear advantages. First, territorial adjudication makes clear what
legal background rules apply to FRAND negotiations and licenses in each
jurisdiction, since no court will have the authority under the FRAND
commitment to interfere with the patent, contract, and competition
regimes of other countries. Such clarity can facilitate the FRAND
negotiation process and the conclusion of agreed licensing arrangements.
In addition, territorial adjudication ends the jurisdictional competition that
results in “races to the bottom” or “races to the courthouse.” Since each
country can only determine FRAND rates for its own patents, no country
has an incentive to favor either patentees or implementers in order to
attract FRAND litigation business. Similarly, since no court can impose
FRAND rates for other countries, neither patentees nor manufacturers
have an incentive to rush to file suit in any particular jurisdiction in order
to exploit the favorable FRAND jurisprudence of that country.
Second, the territorial resolution of FRAND disputes is consistent with
principles of comity. Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation means that
each country will determine the validity and enforceability of its own
patent rights. In this manner, the authority of each country will not be
“infringed or limited by another sovereign’s extension of its
178. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction.”179 Moreover, territorial adjudication will reduce the
frequency of transnational antisuit injunctions. As FRAND litigation in
any one jurisdiction will not affect royalty rates in other countries, courts
will have no reason to enjoin foreign litigation in order to preserve their
own territorially limited jurisdiction. In the words of the Federal Circuit,
the territorial adjudication of FRAND royalties will not “prejudice the
rights of . . . foreign governments” to adjudicate their own national patent
rights.180 As noted above, the meaning of the FRAND commitment cannot
be divorced from its specific interpretation by any particular national law.
As such, no court should presume the authority to commandeer resolution
of the global dispute.
Third, territorial adjudication would allow jurisdictions to set
independent FRAND policies appropriate to their specific social,
economic, and political circumstances.181 Developing countries, for
example, may advocate for lower royalty levels than developing
countries. Developing countries have sometimes chafed against what they
perceive as “onerous” royalties for the use of standardized technology and
have pressed for lower rates or even royalty-free commitments.182 From
these countries’ point of view, SEPs are often exploited in order to mine
exorbitant royalties and exclude competition from developing
countries.183 On the other hand, allowing developing countries to pay
lower FRAND rates can facilitate the local availability of technological
goods, advance the diffusion of technological know-how, and allow firms
in developing countries to compete with more established companies.184

179. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
180. Id. at 901.
181. See also supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of international
comity and reciprocity in respecting the independent economic and other policies of other
jurisdictions).
182. See, e.g., Michael Murphee & Dan Breznitz, Standards, Patents and National
Competitiveness, GLOB. COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPER SERIES, Sept. 30, 2016, at 1, 4
(describing how China has emphasized technology standards with low or royalty-free rates). Of
course, the FRAND policies of developed countries may also diverge. See, e.g., Fei Deng et al.,
Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates, 32 ANTITRUST 47, 48 (2018)
(describing the “substantial” differences between the FRAND rates for Ericsson’s patent portfolio in
the United Kingdom Unwired Planet decision and the United States TCL decision).
183. KEITH MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 166 (2012); Xuan Li & Baisheng An, IPR Misuse:
The Core Issue in Standards and Patents 23 (South Centre Research Papers No. 21, 2009).
184. Murphee & Breznitz, supra note 182, at 6 (stating that in some circumstances, “the openness
of technology standards with RAND-based licensing enables firms to make rapid increases in their
technology capabilities”); see also John Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies,
in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE 57, 61 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003) (observing how strong
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Indeed, what constitutes a “fair and reasonable” royalty rate in a
developing country may differ from the appropriate FRAND rate in a
technologically advanced, developed economy.185 The territorial
adjudication of FRAND commitments could alleviate some pressure from
intellectual property policies and royalty rates that are inappropriate for
local activities.186
Jurisdictions may also have different preferences for the non-monetary
aspects of the FRAND commitment. For example, United States courts
will only in exceptional circumstances issue injunctions against the
infringement of FRAND-committed patents.187 In contrast, other
jurisdictions are less restrained in providing injunctive relief.188 Even
among countries where courts can issue injunctions for the infringement
of a FRAND-committed patent, individual jurisdictions differ in the
intellectual property protections prevent the growth of competitive technology companies in
developing countries).
185. Jorge L. Contreras, National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for
India, in COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR: STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS
AND COMPETITION ISSUES 1, 8–9 (Ashish Bharadwaj et al. eds., 2017) (asserting that in developing
countries “[t]he royalties sought by foreign patent-holding firms, while arguably reasonable on an
international basis, may be viewed as excessive in local markets”).
186. Empirically, it does not seem like developing countries have unreasonably devalued FRANDcommitted patents. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in
India: An Empirical Survey, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1 (2017) (describing how FRAND
litigation in India has “largely resulted in judgments favoring foreign patent holders”); Erick S.
Robertson, Highest Court in China Overturns Ridiculously Low Royalty in Interdigital v. Huawei,
CHINA PAT. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.chinapatentblog.com/blog/highest-court-in-chinaoverturns-ridiculously-low-royalty-in-interdigital-v-huawei [https://perma.cc/B5T5-28U3].
187. J. Gregory Sidak, Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in The United States, in 1
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 389
(Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) (noting that “in the United States, it is exceptional for an SEP holder
to obtain either an injunction or an exclusion order against an infringer of SEPs”). Academic
commentary has also presented divergent views about the proprietary of injunctions in the FRAND
context. Compare Joseph Miller, Standard-Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing
and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 358 (2007) (asserting that “the core meaning of the
RAND promise [is] an irrevocable waiver of injunctive relief”), with Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato,
Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse: A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty
Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 118–19 (2007) (arguing that a
FRAND commitment “cannot be interpreted as an implicit waiver to its right to seek injunctive
relief”).
188. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard Essential Patents
and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 325 (2014) [hereinafter Cotter, Comparative
Law & Economics] (detailing the grant of an injunction against the infringement of standard-essential
patent in South Korea); Thomas F. Cotter, Shenzhen Court Enters Injunction Against Samsung for
Infringement of Huawei SEPs, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Jan. 11, 2018),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2018/01/shenzhen-court-enters-injunction.html
[https://perma.cc/A7SS-REB4] (describing two injunctions issued in Chinese courts); Hermann,
supra note 111, at 589 (noting that patentees continue to seek injunctions in Germany).
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specific standards that must be met in order to grant such non-monetary
remedies.189 The availability of injunctions has important consequences
for the cost of technology and the structure of local markets,190 and the
diversity of international attitudes to FRAND injunctions reflects a broad
range of policy positions regarding these consequences. But one court’s
assertion of authority over a global FRAND dispute effectively cuts off
that debate for all other jurisdictions worldwide. For example, the
Unwired Planet decision to impose a global FRAND license meant that
Huawei’s activities would be licensed worldwide—and neither would
Unwired Planet seek nor would Huawei oppose an injunction for the
infringement of those standard-essential patents in any other jurisdiction.
Similarly, the United States decisions in both Microsoft and Huawei
precluded the enforcement of injunctions issued in Germany and China.
In all of these cases, the courts of one jurisdiction prevented other
countries from implementing their own domestic choices regarding
FRAND policy. By contrast, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction adjudication of
these remedies would allow each country the flexibility to determine its
own terms of access to standardized technology.
Such territorial flexibility dovetails with the current structure of
international intellectual property law. The international Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires
countries to implement a relatively high common baseline of intellectual
property protection.191 At the same time, individual jurisdictions may
adjust that framework to their own domestic preferences and rate of
development.192 For example, with respect to remedies, while TRIPS

189. See generally Cotter, Comparative Law & Economics, at 322–27 (describing the availability
of injunctions in Europe and Asia); Larouche & Zingales, supra note 3, at 419 (noting that “even in
an integrated region like the EU” the standards regarding the issuance of injunctions differ across
jurisdictions, “resulting in a patchwork of remedies”).
190. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996) (asserting that injunctions can
“drive IPR holders in high transaction industries into repeat-play bargaining” and the establishment
of institutional structures to facilitate such bargaining); see generally Mark A. Lemley, Contracting
Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463 (2012) (discussing the effects of liability or property
rules for intellectual property).
191. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [https://perma.cc/32ZP4YDY].
192. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichmann & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 98
(2007) (asserting that flexibility under TRIPS “allow[s] developing countries considerable policy
space in which to maximize the benefits and minimize the social costs of adopting the international
minimum standards”); see generally Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case
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requires that national courts have the authority to impose “damages
adequate to compensate” for infringement, TRIPS does not define what
magnitude of damages would be considered “adequate.”193 Similarly,
while TRIPS demands that courts be able to issue injunctions against
infringement, the agreement does not dictate the standards under which
an injunction should issue.194 As such, territorial adjudication of FRAND
patent remedies is consistent with the freedom and flexibility granted to
countries under the TRIPS agreement. Indeed, the freedom of each
jurisdiction to set its own national intellectual property policies under
TRIPS should be comparatively greater in the FRAND context, where
remedies depend not only on patent law, but also on the contractual
interpretation of the voluntary FRAND commitment and domestic
requirements of competition law.195
In sum, territorial adjudication of FRAND disputes presents systemic
advantages. Territorial adjudication provides legal clarity, facilitates
licensing negotiations, promotes international comity, and allows each
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute according to its own economic needs
and social and political values.196 Achieving these systemic advantages,
however, risks imposing concrete and immediate costs, both on the
individual litigants and on the judicial systems tasked with resolving the
disputes. The following section details the costs of territorial adjudication
but also argues that such costs are unavoidable. Rather than pretending
that such costs can be ducked, standards communities should aim at
minimizing such costs through substantive and procedural mechanisms.
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009)
(describing how India has adapted TRIPS requirements to its own domestic policy preferences).
193. TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 45.1; see also John Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global
Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 706 (2002) (noting that even as TRIPs harmonizes
international patent law, it does not “mandate any particular price for an innovation”); Kapczynksi,
supra note 192, at 1610.
194. TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 44.1; see generally Kapczynksi, supra note 192, at 1607.
195. TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 40.2 (providing that the TRIPS agreement does not “prevent
Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market”). Individual countries may also see standards-related disputes as implicating issues
of national security. See generally Eli Greenbaum, 5G, Standard-Setting, and National Security,
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (July 3, 2018), http://harvardnsj.org/2018/07/5g-standard-setting-and-nationalsecurity/ [https://perma.cc/NG27-LKE8]. Such concerns may potentially have relevance under
TRIPS. See TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 73.
196. The inclusion of a territorial forum-selection clause in a contractual FRAND commitment
cannot prevent national competition law agencies from imposing remedies that affect both domestic
and foreign patents rights. Nonetheless, the insistence by a standard-setting body on the territorial
adjudication of FRAND royalty rates may serve as a cue to regulatory agencies regarding the
normative limits of their jurisdiction.
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The Inevitability of Territorial Adjudication

Courts and commentators have resisted the territorial resolution of
FRAND disputes.197 Indeed, adjudication on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
basis can greatly increase the cost of dispute resolution. Instead of a single
proceeding that resolves the global dispute, the parties may be forced to
slog through duplicative country-by-country litigation.198 For patentees,
the weight of the multiple lawsuits necessary to enforce global patent
rights could hold down the value of those rights.199 For implementers, the
heavy expenses associated with defending against worldwide litigation
could strain company resources and delay or even preclude entry into
important markets.200 For the public, duplicative lawsuits across
jurisdictions strain judicial resources, which could be economized by
aggregating related cases in a single jurisdiction. Indeed, this Article does
not argue that territorial adjudication of FRAND litigation presents the
most efficient means of dispute resolution.201 Rather, this Article
197. For court decisions that have opposed territorial adjudication, see supra text accompanying
notes 57–75. For commentators that have opposed territorial adjudication, see, for example,
Contreras, supra note 16, at 709 (noting the costs of “duplicative negotiation and litigation . . . among
the same parties litigating in different jurisdictions”).
198. Contreras, supra note 16, at 709.
199. The Court of Appeals in Unwired Planet, in justifying a worldwide license, focused on these
costs to the patentee. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344
p. 88, (Eng.) (Requiring Unwired Planet to bring actions in each jurisdiction worldwide would “be a
blue print for hold-out . . . [T]he costs of such litigation for [Unwired Planet] would be prohibitively
high. So the outcome would be that . . . [Unwired Planet] would not be able to secure payment of
royalties for those jurisdictions in which it could not afford to bring proceedings.”). It is not clear,
however, why the Court of Appeals considered only the patentees’ litigation costs but not the converse
costs that a worldwide license imposes on the implementer—a worldwide license requires the
implementer to commence royalty payments under the worldwide license but challenge the patents
on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. Moreover, the question of how to deter opportunistic hold-out
by implementers is often addressed by individual jurisdictions in deciding whether to impose
supracompensatory awards for patent infringement. See generally Colleen V. Chien et al., Enhanced
Damages, Litigation Cost Recovery, and Interest, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS:
TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 158 (forthcoming) (Brad Biddle et al. eds., 2019) (comparing
enhanced damages for patent infringement across jurisdictions). The question of whether to impose
such supracompensatory damages may be better left to individual jurisdictions to determine based
upon their own domestic policy choices.
200. Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 825 (“[R]ights holders can use the necessity of successive actions
to their advantage, to wear users down by bringing actions seriatim . . . . This is a particular problem
for small businesses that lack the legal and technical sophistication . . . and the resources to fight
multiple suits”).
201. At the same time, this author is skeptical of claims that territorial adjudication will result in a
war of attrition as the parties grind their dispute through the courts of each jurisdiction worldwide. A
more likely consequence of requiring territorial adjudication is that the parties will litigate a FRAND
dispute in major markets, and then by settlement extend analogous royalty rates to other jurisdictions
less central to their business. Cf. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 221, Rep. n.4 (suggesting that
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demonstrates the futility of efforts to restrain a tenacious FRAND litigant
from pursuing jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation and argues instead for
the incorporation of cost saving rules and procedures into the FRAND
commitment.
First, the pronouncement by one court that it will impose a global
FRAND resolution comes with no guarantee that other courts and
government regulatory agencies will not make similar assertions of
jurisdiction. As such, no court can provide assurance that its own
assumption of jurisdiction will hold down costs by precluding litigation
in other forums. Indeed, since FRAND commitments typically do not
include a forum-selection clause, the commitment’s language provides no
reason to prefer one jurisdiction over another.202 Both the Microsoft and
Unwired Planet courts pointed to the FRAND commitment’s global
character in order to justify their own authority to resolve the
multinational dispute.203 Any other court and government agency could
make similar claims.
Second, even when courts have asserted jurisdiction to resolve a global
dispute, they have themselves acknowledged that the litigants retain rights
to pursue related litigation in national courts. For example, implementers
have retained the right to challenge patent validity, essentiality, and
infringement in other forums.204 The Unwired Planet court allowed that,
even following the court’s global rate determination, Huawei still retained
the rights to challenge the validity of each patent in its issuing
jurisdiction.205 Indeed, the court expressly allowed that its judicially set
global FRAND rates would be adjusted annually based on continuing

“multinational litigation often ends when the plaintiff wins an action in the defendant’s largest
market”).
202. See supra text accompanying note 87.
203. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “the face of
the [FRAND commitment] contract makes clear that it encompasses not just U.S. patents, but all of
Motorola’s standard-essential patents worldwide”); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co.
[2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 p. 80 (Eng.) (holding that Unwired Planet’s FRAND commitment is a
“single undertaking”).
204. See Dinwoodie, supra note 15, at 745–46 (the costs of “satellite” litigation regarding patent
validity should be “figured into the calculation of efficiency gains that are claimed for consolidation”
of multinational patent disputes in general).
205. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 567 (Eng.). In Unwired
Planet, there were ongoing invalidity proceedings in Germany and China, which were not halted by
the United Kingdom FRAND decision. Id. at 570. Indeed, under regulations of the European Union,
the English court did not have jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of non-English patents. Id. at
566–67. See generally Trimble, supra note 15, at 518 (noting that under European regulations, only
“the courts and administrative bodies of the country in which a patent was granted may decide the
validity of the patent”).
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developments in the “patent landscape.”206 In other words, despite
Unwired Planet’s insistence that imposing worldwide FRAND rates was
necessary to avoid country-by-country litigation, the decision itself
acknowledged that such drawn-out litigation may nonetheless ensue.207
The recent FRAND-related case of Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.208
demonstrates the similar reluctance of United States courts to prevent
foreign courts from adjudicating the validity of foreign patents. In that
case, the parties generally disputed whether Qualcomm had satisfied its
FRAND commitment. Apple brought contract, patent, and competition
law claims against Qualcomm in the United States, as well as the United
Kingdom, Japan, China, and Taiwan.209 Apple’s foreign claims included
challenges to the validity and essentiality of Qualcomm’s foreign
patents.210 In response, among other claims, Qualcomm requested the
court to either confirm that Qualcomm satisfied its FRAND commitment,
or, alternatively, to set global FRAND rates.211 Qualcomm then asked the
United States district court to enjoin Apple’s pursuit of its foreign claims,
asserting that all of Apple’s foreign claims were related to—and would be
resolved by—a United States decision concerning a global FRAND
license. The court, however, refused to enjoin the foreign claims, stating
that it “cannot adjudicate or enforce the patent law of the U.K., China,
Japan or Taiwan.”212 Altogether, Apple remained free to pursue its foreign
patent law claims notwithstanding Qualcomm’s claims for the
determination of a global FRAND royalty rate.213
Claims regarding the breach of a contractual FRAND commitment
often go hand-in-hand with antitrust-related claims. As with patent claims,
an implementer that is a dogged litigant may continue to pursue such
206. Unwired Planet. [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) p. 89(iv), [2018] AC p. 89(iv).
207. See also Microsoft., 696 F.3d at 888 (upholding anti-suit injunction since it does not bar
pursuit of German patent claims); Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) (clarifying that injunction is
limited to the enforcement of Chinese injunctions). But see TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v.
Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at
*19 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (enjoining all foreign litigation concerning counterpart patents,
including regarding validity). The TCL parties, however, consented to the broad scope of the
injunction.
208. No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017).
209. Id. at *13–16 (describing Apple’s claims under foreign law in foreign jurisdictions).
210. Id.
211. Id. at *12.
212. Id. at *43.
213. See also Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2018] E.W.H.C. 808
p. 18 (Eng.) (discussing a United Kingdom suit to set global FRAND rates where defendants Huawei
and ZTE remained free to challenge the validity of Chinese patents in Chinese courts).
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antitrust claims through multiple forums even following a global rate
determination. For example, in Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm, Apple had also
advanced competition-related claims in a number of foreign
jurisdictions.214 The United States district court also refused to enjoin
those claims, reasoning that “even resolution of Qualcomm’s global
contractual [FRAND] obligations” would not “dispose of Apple’s
anticompetitive claims abroad.”215 Moreover, according to the court,
“Apple had a legitimate reason” to separately pursue the foreign
competition law claims since “antitrust laws differ significantly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”216 Each of the foreign sovereigns also had a
separate interest in examining potential anti-competitive effects in their
territory. As such, a ruling to enjoin the foreign competition law claims
would interfere with comity and “deprive” those countries of their
jurisdiction to scrutinize domestic competition law matters.217
Persistent patentees can also force jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
litigation. Even if proceedings to set a global FRAND rate continue in one
jurisdiction, a patentee that holds foreign counterpart patents will
ordinarily still be able to advance infringement claims in those foreign
jurisdictions. For example, in both Microsoft v. Motorola and Huawei v.
Samsung, the patentee filed suit in the United States as well as in foreign
jurisdictions.218 In both cases, the foreign case progressed faster than the
corresponding United States litigation, with the foreign court issuing an
injunction against further infringement in the foreign jurisdiction.219
Though in both cases the United States court prohibited patentees
(Motorola and Huawei, respectively) from enforcing the foreign
injunctive relief, the courts otherwise allowed the foreign case to continue
in parallel. In other words, both Motorola and Huawei were permitted to
214. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835, at *13–16.
215. Id. at *36.
216. Id. at *41–42
217. Id. at *56. Cf. Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-cv-4988, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71919, at
*34–36 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015) (stating that contract-related claims regarding the unauthorized
disclosure of proposed FRAND rates would not be dispositive of Chinese competition-law claims).
But see Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. 2831 p. 3 (Eng.) (noting a
readiness to enjoin Chinese competition law claims related to the UK court’s determination for global
FRAND rates). However, the Chinese proceedings at issue in Unwired Planet were only commenced
subsequent to the decision of the UK court. This may have increased the possibility that the latter saw
the Chinese proceedings as interfering with its “jurisdiction, judgment and processes.” Id.
218. See Microsoft v. Motorola, 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing related litigation in
Germany by General Instruments Corporation, part of the Motorola Group); Huawei Techs. Co. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 13, 2018) (describing related litigation in China).
219. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 879; Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *12.
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continue pursuing foreign infringement claims and related demands for
damages (but not injunctions) in the foreign jurisdiction. The Ninth
Circuit expressly noted that the injunction against Motorola prohibited
enforcement of the foreign injunction, but otherwise left Motorola “free
to continue litigating . . . as to damages or other non-injunctive
remedies.”220 Similarly, the Huawei court noted that its order only
enjoined “Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunctions” and was
limited to that “specific form of relief.”221 In other words, the assertion of
one court that it has authority to adjudicate a global FRAND dispute has
not stopped patentees from continuing to litigate infringement of the same
patents in foreign jurisdictions.222
Moreover, even if a court resolutely brings peace to a global FRAND
dispute, a patentee unhappy with the terms of the truce’ may nonetheless
persevere with related non-FRAND hostilities. Patentees with rich
worldwide FRAND portfolios typically also hold patents that are not
subject to any such FRAND obligations.223 Such non-FRAND patents
may cover complementary technologies that, while not essential to
implementation of a standard, remain of significant commercial import.224
FRAND disputes often feature such non-FRAND patents in a supporting
role. For example, in Huawei v. Samsung, in addition to bringing SEP
infringement claims in United States court, Huawei also brought suit in
China for the infringement of thirteen SEPs and an additional seven nonSEPs.225 The Unwired Planet case also included infringement claims for

220. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 889.
221. Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *40.
222. See also TQ Delta LLC v. ZyXEL Commc’ns Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02013-RGA, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98228, at *10 (D. Del. June 12, 2018) (allowing litigation for the infringement of FRANDcommitted patents to proceed in parallel in the United States and the United Kingdom).
223. Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past The SEP Rand Obsession: Some Thoughts on the Economic
Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1093, 1101–02 (2014) (“[T]he typical firm participating in a [standard-setting organization]
holds more than just SEPs within its patent portfolio. Some of these non-SEP patents might play a
supporting role to SEPs . . . they might cover differentiating technologies that enable their holder to
compete more effectively in downstream markets”).
224. Id.
225. Jacob Schindler, How Samsung and Huawei have Fared in 42 Chinese Patent Cases Against Each
Other So Far, IAM (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/how-samsung-and-huaweihave-fared-42-chinese-patent-cases-against-each-other-so-far [https://perma.cc/R37G-NBW6]; see also
Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *12 n.7 (“The parties filed a total of 42 infringement actions in
China, one corresponding to each patent, both SEP and non-SEP.”). The antisuit injunction issued by the
United States district court was only in regards to Samsung’s SEPs. Id. at *12–13.
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a non-SEP.226 In TCL, the patentee Ericsson sued for infringement of SEPs
in six foreign jurisdictions, as well as suing for infringement of different,
non-essential patents in another United States jurisdiction. The TCL court
enjoined pursuit of the foreign actions, but allowed Ericsson to continue
to pursue the non-SEP litigation, reasoning that the court had “no basis to
prevent Ericsson from pursuing infringement claims that will not be
resolved by the present FRAND litigation.”227 In other words, non-SEPs
are not ordinarily subject to any contractual licensing commitment. While
a court may be prepared to consolidate worldwide FRAND litigation in
order to bring resolution to the FRAND dispute, there will ordinarily be
no contractual predicate for bringing foreign non-SEPs under the court’s
jurisdiction. As such, even a global FRAND determination may not
necessarily bring a cessation of litigation.228
The ability of determined patentees and implementers to compel
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation, while perhaps undermining the
efficient consolidation of FRAND disputes into a single forum, rises from
the international system’s foundations. In the words of the eminent
international jurist Vaughan Lowe, “[t]he legal rules and principles
governing jurisdiction have a fundamental importance in international
relations, because they are concerned with the allocation between
States . . . [of] the competence to secure the differences that make each
State a distinct society.”229 Each country develops its own patent and
competition policy from its understanding of the policies appropriate to
its own economic, social, and cultural circumstances. FRAND disputes in
particular implicate a broad range of potentially significant economic
policy decisions for each sovereign, from the efficient encouragement of
domestic innovation, the need for broad access to advanced technology,
and the economic struggle between foreign and domestic commercial
actors. In this light, it is not surprising that each jurisdiction jealously
guards the authority to decide the invalidity and scope of its own domestic
patents and the reach of its own competition law. As such, even if one
court attempts to impose its own interpretation of FRAND royalties, and
226. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 2 (Eng.). The licensing
agreement determined by the English court in Unwired Planet did not include rights to Unwired Planet’s nonstandard-essential patents. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 1304 (Eng.).
227. TCL Commc’n, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *15.
228. See also Qualcomm FTC Comments, supra note 172, at 17 (claiming that “the large majority
of patents being asserted . . . are not even claimed to be essential,” and parties could “[u]se the
leverage gained from actual or threatened non-essential-patent-based injunctions to force a
renegotiation of the SEP-only license”).
229. Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed.
2006) (emphasis omitted).
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even if that monetary decision is respected by other jurisdictions, those
other jurisdictions may subsequently demand their own say on related
issues of domestic importance.
C.

How to Reduce the Costs of Territorial Adjudication

Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation imposes heavy costs, but the
FRAND commitment provides a ready foundation for contractual
mechanisms that can ease that burden. Outside of the FRAND context,
some commentators have suggested that multinational patent litigation
could be simplified through cross-border cooperation and coordination.230
The non-FRAND context, however, presents non-trivial barriers to the
adoption of such processes, since cross-border implementation could
require an international agreement or formal treaty.231 In contrast,
FRAND disputes march forward under the discipline of the FRAND
commitment, and that contractual commitment could also include
substantive and procedural frameworks for international cooperation and
coordination. Again, such mechanisms would not prevent parties from
agreeing on alternative means of dispute resolution. A failure to agree on
such alternative arrangements, however, would trigger the default
framework of territorial litigation that this Article advocates,
accompanied by supporting mechanisms aimed at reducing the costs and
expenses of dispute resolution.
On a substantive level, the FRAND commitment could provide that
factual determinations made in FRAND litigation by the judicial
authorities of one jurisdiction should be presumptively adopted in
subsequent litigation, including by foreign tribunals in subsequent
proceedings.232 Such an agreement would allow both United States and
230. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, at pt. II Introductory Note (recommending
principles for transnational patent adjudication, and noting that the suggested principles “aim to create
efficiency through coordinated adjudication”); James Pooley & Vicki Huang, Multi-National Patent
Litigation: Management of Discovery and Settlement Issues and the Role of the Judiciary, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 45, 47 (2011) (offering suggestions for improving “the
efficient management of multinational patent disputes”); see generally Dreyfuss, supra note 15
(commenting on the ALI Principles).
231. See, e.g., Begley, supra note 15, at 569 (recommending the establishment of a “multinational
organization, established by treaty, creating a global patent that is respected in all member states and
enforced by an international patent court,” but also recognizing the obstacles to creating such a
system); Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 826 (noting the limited advantages of the ALI Principles, since
“the drafters do not represent states”); Pooley & Huang, supra note 230, at 56 (describing the
constraints of obtaining cross-border discovery under existing international arrangements).
232. See also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 222 Rep. n.1 (proposing that multi-jurisdictional
patent litigation may be streamlined by parties agreeing to be “bound by a single court’s factual
determinations”).
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foreign courts to rely on the determinations of other decisionmaking
bodies, thus reducing the need for extensive discovery and duplicative
litigation to repeatedly “prove” the same facts. Such an agreement need
not completely prohibit the reexamination of factual determinations in
other jurisdictions. Rather, the FRAND commitment could employ a more
flexible arrangement—for example, requiring the acceptance of foreign
factual findings, except to the extent that those factual findings emerge
from factors specific to the foreign legal framework.233
An agreement to employ the fact-finding of foreign tribunals can be
enforceable in United States courts. Admittedly, the Federal Circuit has
held that foreign patent law decisions cannot be used to preclude litigation
of the same legal issues in the United States.234 However, a number of
subsequent decisions have limited Federal Circuit’s holding and
welcomed the admission of foreign factual determinations in certain
circumstances.235 For example, some courts permit the adoption of factual
findings made in foreign patent litigation if the parties have agreed to the
preclusive effect of such factual determinations.236 The FRAND
commitment could provide firm contractual foundations for such an
agreement, and allow United States courts to adopt the factual findings of
FRAND royalty determinations made in other jurisdictions.
Even in the absence of an agreement, some United States courts have
allowed the importation of foreign determinations so long as the court sifts
through the foreign judgments to exclude legal conclusions. For example,
in Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar,237 a district court held that it could adopt
the factual findings of a Canadian court regarding the validity of a

233. For example, if a court determines that a specific agreement provides a comparable license
that can aid in the calculation of patent royalties, subsequent litigation may challenge that factual
determination to the extent that the subsequent jurisdiction take a substantially different approach as
to what constitutes a “comparable” license.
234. See, e.g., Medtronic Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 907–08 (Fed Cir. 1986), cert. denied
479 U.S. 931 (1986) (rejecting an argument that the court should adopt a German judgment that a
German counterpart patent was obvious, stating that “[t]his argument is specious,” and “[t]he patent
laws of the United States are the laws governing a determination of obviousness/nonobviousness of a
United States patent in a federal court”); see also Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 729 F. Supp. 234, 238–39
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (listing cases to show that the Federal Circuit has shown a “general antipathy to
applying collateral estoppel” in order to adopt the findings of foreign courts).
235. See infra notes 236–239 and accompanying text.
236. Oneac Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1243 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Merck
& Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 601, 611 (D. Del. 2003) (refusing to adopt the
findings of a British court concerning “mixed questions of law and fact”, and distinguishing Oneac
since the parties in that case “agreed to be bound by such factual findings”).
237. 745 F. Supp. 517, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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Canadian patent, after ensuring that those “findings are free of the
influence of legal differences.”238 The court endorsed the efficiency of this
approach, asserting that a contrary rule would turn international patent
litigation into a “war of attrition, in which after the conclusion of one
battle parties move on to another and duplicate the engagement.”239
Even when United States courts have resisted the adoption of foreign
patent findings, that has generally meant opposition to the acceptance of
determinations related to the validity or infringement of foreign patents.240
Indeed, as discussed above, matters of patent validity are often intertwined
tightly with the legal and policy frameworks of individual jurisdictions.
FRAND battles, however, see the parties clash over a legion of details in
a fundamentally economic analysis of patent value. These details can
include, for example, the total economic value that a standard contributes
to a product241 and the proportional share of that total value attributable to
the patents owned by the litigants.242 This latter determination, in
particular, can combine the methodical counting of the owned patents
with a specialized, technical evaluation of patent strength243—neither of
which are likely to involve findings that are closely related to the legal
framework of any particular jurisdiction.244 FRAND royalty

238. Id.
239. Id. at 525.
240. Medtronic Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting the adoption of a
German ruling finding a patent obvious); Merck, 288 F. Supp. At 611 (denying preclusive effect to
the obviousness decision of a U.K. court); Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 729 F. Supp. 234, 234 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (denying preclusive effect to validity and infringement decisions of a U.K. court).
241. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV 15-2370
JVS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *47 (using patentee’s public statements and press releases to
determine an aggregate royalty burden for use of the standard); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei
Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 264 (Eng.) (same); cf. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC. No. 11 C
9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *176–77 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (determining profit margin
on a WiFi chip, in order to determine the aggregate royalty burden for use of the standard).
242. TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *30–31 (describing methodology for the
calculation of FRAND rates); Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *180–81 (determining
strength of applicable standard-essential patents); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co.
[2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 178 (Eng.) (same).
243. TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *47 (patent counting in a FRAND royalty
analysis); Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *177 (assessing the number of patents
essential to the standard); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60233, at *269 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (patent counting in order to extract a comparable
valuation from a patent pool); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711
p. 198 (Eng.) (counting Unwired Planet’s patents to determine its share of a larger patent portfolio);
id. at 273 (patent counting in a FRAND royalty analysis).
244. But see TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *65 (patent counting methodology
does not include expired patents, as required by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in

09 - Greenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL

10/1/2019 3:28 PM

1133

determinations may also involve the “unpacking” of potentially
comparable license agreements—the economic analysis of all the varied
terms of those licenses to derive a single royalty rate that can be used for
comparison purposes.245 Again, “unpacking” typically involves a
technical economic analysis that does not hinge on the underpinnings of
any specific legal culture. Adopted factual findings could potentially also
include details of the parties’ (failed) negotiations towards FRAND
rates,246 which may be relevant to deciding whether the parties bargained
in compliance with the FRAND commitment.247
The FRAND commitment could also include procedural mechanisms
for easing the burden of jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation. For
example, the ALI has proposed that multi-jurisdictional patent litigation
could be streamlined by encouraging litigants to coordinate the scope of
their dispute and associated discovery across jurisdictions.248 Such
coordination could be effected through global mediation or case
management conferences to discuss discovery and possible settlement
options on a worldwide basis.249 Similarly, direct communication between
the various national courts handling a global FRAND litigation could
assist in identifying means of sharing resources and agreeing on efficient
cross-border procedures.250 In general, outside of the FRAND context,
implementing the ALI recommendations could require an international
agreement on common procedures for the resolution of transnational
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964)). Courts in other jurisdictions may come to different
conclusions regarding counting expired patents.
245. Id. at *95 (describing the process of unpacking licenses); see also Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd.
v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 pp. 187–90 (Eng.) (same); Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60233, at *246 (providing a monetary value for access to technology provided through the
MPEG-LA patent pool).
246. TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *9 (reviewing the history of the parties’
FRAND negotiation)
247. An agreement to apply prior judicial factual findings would also need to address how that
agreement will apply to parties that are affiliated with the original litigants but not actual parties to
the first litigation.
248. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 222 Rep. note 1 (proposing that “substantial benefits could
be achieved if, before any trial commences, the parties agree to take the inventor’s testimony a single
time, choose to focus their disputes on the same embodiments of the accused device, and stipulate to
the documents and practices that constitute the prior art”).
249. Pooley & Huang, supra note 230, at 64 (proposing cross-jurisdictional procedures for
streamlining multinational patent litigation).
250. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 222 Rep. note 1 (describing potential “[j]udicial
cooperation”); see also Pooley & Huang, supra note 230, at 66 (recommending formal and informal
communication between judges); Cf. Jay L. Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 567, 580 (2003) (advocating for direct judicial communication to coordinate transnational
insolvency proceedings).
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patent disputes.251 Many of those recommendations, however, could be
incorporated into the FRAND contractual commitment, which could
provide an agreed procedural framework for the efficient resolution of
transnational disputes.252
To date, the paucity of formal arrangements for coordinating
international patent litigation means that courts have little experience with
such means of cooperation.253 As such, it is difficult to predict what
mechanisms could provide substantive support for the facilitation of
international judicial communication and coordination. At the same time,
a FRAND contractual commitment that requires common procedural
mechanisms for streamlining global litigation could provide courts with
much-needed experience in transnational coordination. As such, the
intellectual property policies of standard-setting organizations could
provide fertile ground for studying such cross-border mechanisms and
eventually expanding such procedures to other areas of intellectual
property law.
CONCLUSION
Commentators and regulators have sometimes recommended the
inclusion of more substantive rules in the FRAND commitment.254 The
intellectual property policies of most standard-setting organizations are
light on detailing the meaning of FRAND, and such recommendations aim
at providing FRAND requirements with more explanatory heft.255 Such
recommendations have included, for example, clearly restricting the right
of a FRAND-committed patentee to obtain injunctive relief, as well as
rules and procedures to assist in calculating a FRAND royalty rate.256
Indeed, following these calls, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
251. Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 826 (noting the limited utility of the ALI Principles in the absence
of an international agreement).
252. Id. (noting that certain of the ALI Principles could “[be] adopted through the consent of the
parties”).
253. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 223 Rep. note (noting that there is “insufficient experience
with coordination to build upon” in creating cooperative procedures).
254. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One
Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 161 (2007); Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can
Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, 3 ANTITRUST CHRON. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
1, 4 (2013), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar13Special.pdf [https://perma.cc/52HP-DUAS]; Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, SIX “SMALL” PROPOSALS FOR SSOS BEFORE LUNCH 9 (Oct. 10, 2012)
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download [https://perma.cc/MR4V-2GAV].
255. See, e.g., Kilhn et al., supra note 254, at 4; Hesse, supra note 254, at 9–10.
256. See Kilhn et al., supra note 254, at 4.
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Engineers Standards Association (“IEEE-SA”) substantially revised its
own patent policy to clarify the FRAND obligation.257
This Article has proposed that, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, FRAND obligations should be interpreted by national courts. In
other words, in contrast to some prior suggestions for clarifying the
policies of standard-setting organizations, this Article does not offer
substantive modifications to FRAND rules but rather proposes including
a jurisdictional standard for determining which court should be entrusted
with explicating such rules. Nevertheless, the crucial interpretive
commentary provided by national courts should not obviate the role of
standard-setting organizations. Courts can only provide their reading of
the specific language of the FRAND commitment before them. 258 In
contrast, standard-setting organizations can, at least within the confines of
mandatory patent and antitrust law, adapt the language of the FRAND
commitment in response to these court decisions and market
requirements.259
The approach advocated by this Article should result in a collection of
public case law interpreting the parties’ rights and obligations under the
FRAND commitment in varied legal regimes and circumstances. Indeed,
recent court decisions have provided much-needed clarity to certain
aspects of FRAND and the rights and remedies of both patentees and
implementers. Such decisions should be taken by standard-setting
organizations as part of a dialogue—to the extent participants disagree
with courts’ interpretive conclusions, they can advocate within standardsetting organizations for modifying and clarifying the substance of the
organizations’ intellectual property policies. The jurisdictional rules
proposed by this Article do not foreclose further dialogue about the
FRAND commitment’s substantive content, but rather invite more parties
into the conversation.

257. IEEE
STANDARDS
ASS’N,
POLICIES
AND
PROCEDURES
§ 6,
https://standards.ieee.org/about/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html [https://perma.cc/PUC9-TLQU]. The
revisions to the IEEE-SA policy included suggestions for the calculation of FRAND royalties,
clarification that FRAND obligations apply to all licensees on the supply chain, and limitations on
the pursuit of injunctive relief. See Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP 10 (Feb. 2,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/02/311470.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6ZJ-F4WC].
258. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding
that trial courts should consider the actual language of the FRAND commitment at issue in instructing
juries).
259. But see A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND
Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2131 (2017) (expressing skepticism that standardsetting organizations “can in general be counted on to adopt effective FRAND policies”).

